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Abstract  
 
 
This Thesis analyzes the bank transaction regarding cashing or accepting for deposit 
instruments over forged or unauthorized indorsements. Also, it investigates the 
development of conversion of instruments through the years and the courts’ contribution 
to the development. It examines the U.C.C. former section 3-419 and the courts’ reaction 
to the defense afforded to banks against an allegation of conversion and examines as well 
the current 3-420 and the reasons that led to the amendment. Besides all that, this Thesis 
discusses the banks’ defenses regarding Impostors and Fictitious Payees under § 3-404, 
Employer’s responsibility for fraudulent indorsement by his employee under § 3-405, and 
negligence contributing to forged signature or alteration of an instrument under§ 3-406. 
Eventually, it analyzes the courts’ recognition for the reasonable commercial standards 
that banks must exercise when they cash or accept for deposit instruments over forged or 
unauthorized indorsements. 
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I. Introduction 
In the United State, the common law perspective of the relationship between banks and clients is 
a relation of debtors and creditors. The common law established a duty on banks to pay out 
checks only by the client’s instructions.  
      In 1952, Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was enacted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI). The 
UCC contains Article 3 that governs (Negotiable Instruments). Besides Article 4 which covers 
bank deposits and collections. The states have adopted Article 3 and 4, and they became 
applicable as a part of all 50 states’ commercial code.  The UCC regulates the duty of care that 
bank owes to the clients. 
Under the Code, a relationship between the bank and its client accrued when the client 
deposits money in his account within the bank. The deposition starts the duty of the bank to do 
not withdrew money out of the account without the authorization of the client. Section 4-401 
says that a bank may charge against a customer’s account an item that is properly payable. A 
payment is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in accordance with the 
agreement. Allowing someone to withdraw money from the client account without the client’s 
permitting leads to breach of the contract with the client. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act makes 
bank potentially liable for their bad faith honoring a check drawn by fiduciaries to 
misappropriate funds from the principal who owns the account.  
The duty of the bank under the contractual relationship with the client comprises good 
faith and ordinary care. The U.C.C. permits the parties to vary the contract’s provisions, but it 
does not allow the waiver of the duty of good faith and ordinary care: 
The parties to the agreement cannot disclaim a bank’s responsibility for its lack of good 
faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the measure of damages for the lack or failure. 
However, the parties may determine by agreement the standards by which the bank's 
responsibility is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.  
In this thesis, I undertake an analysis of how the Code protect the interests of non-
customers since banks have no duty of care toward towards any person outside the contractual 
relationship. Specifically, when a bank cashes or accepts for deposit an instrument over a forged 
or an unauthorized indorsement. How could the real owner of the instrument recover from the 
bank that dealt with the forger of the instrument? 
The issue of an instrument bearing a forged or an unauthorized indorsement happens in 
many ways. For instance, after a drawer issued an instrument payable to a specific person or for 
a bearer, delivered the instrument to the payee. After the payee received the instrument, a forger 
stole the instrument and forged the signature of the real payee then took the instrument to a 
depositary bank. The depositary bank cashed the instrument or accepted for deposit into the 
forger account. Later, the depositary bank forwarded the instrument to the drawee bank for 
collection. The drawee bank transferred the amount of the instrument to the depositary bank.   
The question that this Thesis answers is how the real owner of the instrument could 
recover from the depositary bank that cashed or accepted for deposit the instrument over a forged 
of an authorized signature in the absence of a contractual relationship.  
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a.    Rationale of this Study 
My focus on conversion is motivated by several considerations. How could the theory of 
conversion protect the interest of the owner of a forged instrument? How the courts have 
explicated the theory of conversion in the area of banking activities? How has the theory of 
conversion and its application developed through the time?  
1.    the application of the theory of conversion  
It is attractive to study deeply the application of the theory of conversion and its 
protection regarding the instruments bearing forged or unauthorized indorsements. I wanted to 
understand the elements of an action for conversion and when we could consider that a bank 
converted property of another owner. Also, when could an owner of an instrument start an action 
for conversion? Moreover, could the bank encounter the conversion action and if so, what are the 
defenses that the bank could allege to prevail. However, if the owner of an instrument wins the 
suit, to any extent the bank would be liable. Is the bank liable to the amount of the instrument or 
to other amounts estimated by courts according to the facts presented in each case?  
2.    Interpretation of Conversion  
It is significant to me as a researcher in banking law to understand how courts interpreted 
the conversion and whether the conversion action was sufficient and effective to protect the 
interest of the owner of an instrument. Also, when could the owner of the instrument lose his 
case of conversion against the depositary bank. It is interesting to study whether an owner of an 
instrument is going to win in every time a depositary bank converted his or her instrument, or 
there are occasions in which a depositary bank is going to prevail against the owner. Also, what 
could be the facts that may lead the courts to hold for the deposited bank and whether the 
depository bank really deserves to prevail in the eyes of public policies. 
3.    The development of Conversion under U.C.C. 
     Adopting to the theory of conversion within the U.C.C.’s sections was not a new suggestion 
by the Legislature of the Code. It is a development that has happened during a very long period. 
In the United State, the courts started hearing cases regarding conversion of instruments since the 
first quarter of the 19th century and after that the Negotiable Instrument Law, which was adopted 
by twenty states as well as the District of Columbia, had regulated the occasions of cashing or 
accepting for deposit instruments over forged in or unauthorized indorsements in section 23. It is 
really motivating to me to study how has the conversion action developed during this period and 
what are the reasons that have led the Legislature of the Code to amend the section that regulates 
the conversion action. 
b. Overview of the Thesis 
This work is divided into five chapters in addition to the present one. Chapter II sets out 
two theories under which jurisdictions allowed recovery against depositary banks. The owner of 
a forged instrument could sue the depository bank under the doctrine of conversion, or the theory 
of money had and received.  Chapter II focuses on section 23 of Negotiable Instruments Law 
which regulated conversion. Also, the Chapter illustrates the exemption that the courts developed 
for a broker who dealt with negotiable securities in a bearer form. When a broker sold stolen 
bearer bonds and remitted the proceeds of the sale to his principal in good faith. Also, this 
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Chapter II defines the method by which an owner of an instrument could sue for conversion or 
money had and received a depositary bank to restore his instrument. 
Chapter III consists of subsection § 3-419(3) which altered the former rules regarding 
depositary banks’ liability on cashing or accepting for deposit instruments over an unauthorized 
or a forged indorsement. Examining the alteration of depositary banks’ liability, its new elements 
under § 3-419(3), and the courts’ reaction to the subsection shows the reasons that drove the 
legislatures to the recent amendment of the subsection in 1990. Chapter III discusses first the 
defense that subsection 3-419(3) afforded depositary banks to absolve from liability of dealing 
with an instrument bearing an unauthorized or forged indorsement and second, the court’s 
response to the new defense and the alteration of the pre-U.C.C. legal doctrines. Lastly, the 
Chapter examines whether the courts’ approaches were an appropriate cause that led to the 
amendment of the section 3-419. 
 Chapter IV discusses why the Article 3 is an applicable law for any conversion action. 
Chapter IV also addresses current 3-420 and its alteration on depositary banks’ liability for 
conversion, and when an owner could sue a depositary bank for conversion. After that, the 
Chapter illustrates whether the drawer of an instrument could sue for conversion. Lastly, the 
Chapter concentrates on the depositary bank defenses to prevail in a suit for conversion. 
 
Eventually, Chapter V addresses the conclusion of this thesis and presents the reflections 
which could be significant to any person who wants to understand deeply the doctrine of 
conversion in practices regarding negotiable instruments.  
 
 
II. Depositary Bank’s Liability Pre-U.C.C. 
Before the enactment of the U.C.C.,1 a real owner of an instrument2 had an absolute 
right3 to retrieve his instrument or its proceeds from at least four parties; the forger of the 
indorsement, the drawer of the instrument, the payor bank, and the depositary bank. Though the 
conflict among the jurisdictions as to which theories of recovery the real owner is entitled to, 
roughly all courts recognized the right of the actual owner to recover from a depositary bank that 
cashed an instrument before collection or accepted it for deposit in the forger account.  
                                                          
1 - The Uniform Commercial Code published in 1952, which, after that, was adopted by all 50 states.  
2 - “A check is payable to order when by its terms it is made payable to an identified person.” U.C.C. § 3-109 (1).  
3 - Forged signature; effect of. When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose 
signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge 
therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, 
unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of 
authority,” Section 23 of Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act of The United States of 1896. 
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Jurisdictions allowed recovery against the depositary bank under two theories. The payee 
could sue the depository bank for conversion4 or money had and received.5 This Chapter focuses 
on section 23 of Negotiable Instruments Law which regulated an action for conversion and the 
exemption that the courts developed for a broker who dealt with negotiable securities in a bearer 
form. When a broker sold stolen bearer bonds and remitted the proceeds of the sale to his 
principal in good faith, the courts refused to find the broker liable for conversion. Also, Chapter 
II defines how an owner of an instrument could sue for conversion or money had and received a 
depositary bank to restore his property.  
1. Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law 
Before the adoption of the U.C.C., section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law6  
regulated an action for conversion to an owner of a forged instrument to retrieve his instrument 
or its proceeds from the unlawful holder. Since section 23 decided that any person receive an 
instruments or its proceeds over a forged or an unauthorized indorsement has no right to them,7 
and the real owner of the instrument of its proceeds has the right to recover from the unlawful 
                                                          
4 - In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Citizens' & Peoples' Nat'l Bank, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917), which was cited by 
21 courts, the court hold that the act of the drawee bank shows a conversion. 
Also, “It might be a hardship upon the defendant, but that by law a person is guilty of a conversion who 
intermeddles with my property and disposes of it; and it is no answer that he acted under authority of another who 
himself had no authority to dispose of it.” 
And, “The first count of the declaration may be considered as one in common-law action for the conversion 
of a check. The check was the property of the plaintiff; it was in the plaintiff's possession, for Weekly’s possession 
was the plaintiff's possession; it was taken by the defendant upon whom it was drawn, and the proceeds paid to a 
person who had no authority from the plaintiff to receive it; the account of the drawer was charged with the amount 
paid and the check was returned to the drawer. It was unnecessary to allege a demand by the plaintiff and a refusal 
by the defendant to return the check, because the allegations of the declaration show a conversion.” Louisville & N. 
R. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 74 Fla. at 387-88. 
5 - “The basis of this action is that the indorsements were forged and the payments to the forger unauthorized. The 
depositary bank contends that this action cannot be maintained because of the provision of section 188 of the NIA, 
which reads: “A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer 
with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies the check.” Conceding 
the forgery for the purpose, it argues that payment on the forged indorsements was no payment at all; that the 
drawee banks could not charge the amounts paid against the respective accounts of the drawers; that it is liable to 
reimburse the drawee banks; that the drawers and the payee were in no way affected by the payment of the money 
by the drawee banks to it on the forged indorsements; that the money paid to it was the money of the drawee banks, 
in which neither the drawers nor the payee had any interest; and that there is no contractual relation between it and 
the payee which establishes an obligation to pay. This suit is not brought on the checks. We agree that under the 
NIA the payee of an unaccepted check, who holds it, cannot sue the drawee, and he certainly could not maintain an 
action against a bank, other than the drawee, which refused to pay the check on demand. The payee does not contend 
that it has a right to base its action on the check or on any contractual relation arising out of the check as such. It 
seeks to recover the value of its property which came into the hands of the depositary bank and for which the 
depositary bank refuses to account. The payee might have brought an action of trover against depositary bank for 
unlawful conversion of its property, but it chose to waive the tort and to bring its action in assumpsit for money had 
and received for its use. That it had a right to do this is well established by the great weight of authority. The payee 
ratifies the collection of the check for it, and by this act ratifies the assumed payment of the check. Both the drawer 
and the drawee of the check are released from paying it over again, because the payee, by ratifying the payment, is 
estopped from making a claim against either.” Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Ft. Dearborn Nat'l Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 
142 N.E. 458 (1924). at 280-81. 
6 - Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act of The United States of 1896. 
7 - “When depositor-drawer of check is precluded from setting up forgery of indorsement or want of authority 
against drawee bank.” Gresham State Bank v. O & K Constr. Co., 231 Or. 106, 370 P.2d 726 (1962). 
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holder. Section 23 stated that a forged or an unauthorized indorsement cannot be operative and 
therefore give no rights to the indorsee. Thus, a depositary bank who cashed or accepted an 
instrument for deposit without the real payee’s authorized indorsement possess no title and when 
the depositary bank collects the proceeds of the instrument from the drawee bank, the depositary 
bank’s dominion wrongfully exerted over the real payee’s personal property in denial of or 
inconsistent with his title or rights therein, or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such title or 
rights, without the owner's consent and without lawful justification.8 
Also, under general rule pre-U.C.C., the owner of an instrument has the right to recover 
his proceeds under the theory of money had and received. For instance, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri9 stated that a depositary bank which accepted the check on a forged indorsement 
acquires no title and holds the proceeds of the check when collected from the drawee bank, for 
the real payee or rightful owner, who may recover from the depositary bank for money had and 
received. The actual owner is entitled to recovery even though the depositary bank has fully paid 
over and accounted for the same amount to the forger without awareness or suspicion of the 
forgery, and such rule applies to indorsements by a person bearing the same name as the payee, 
and to indorsements by the payee’s agent without authority.10 
Also, as a notice, the owner of the instrument in addition to the forger himself could sue 
either the drawer of the instrument. The cause of the action against the drawer is the underlying 
obligation for which the drawer gave an instrument.11 The owner also could sue the payor bank 
which paid the check over the unauthorized indorsement unless the owner is precluded, by his 
ratification, negligence, or any facts creating an estoppel.12  
 
2. The Broker’s Exception 
Under NIL13 both brokers and depositary banks dealing with an instrument bearing an 
unauthorized or forged indorsement were liable to the real payee. A broker, as an agent for his 
principal, is liable for conversion to a real owner of an instrument as s/he was the principal.14 
Since the broker stood in the shoes of his principal when s/he sold personal property,15 the broker 
                                                          
8 - Frederick J. Jr. Murphy, Depositary Bank Liability in Conversion under U.C.C. Section 3-419(3), 34 Wayne L. 
Rev.357 (1987) at page 360. 
9 - Chemical Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Sav. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. 1966). 
10 - Chemical Workers Basic Union, 411 S.W.2d at 162. 
11 - “The payee could recover from the drawer of the check.  The cause of action was generally recognized as one on 
the underlying obligation for which the check was given, since the genuine payee had never received any money. 
But when the check was stolen from the mails or otherwise diverted prior to the payee's physical receipt, in some 
jurisdictions the true payee was unable to recover from the drawer.” Hart v. Moore, 158 So. 490 (Miss. 1935); 
Siegel v. Kovinsky, 93 Misc. 541, 157 N.Y.S. 340 (App. Term 1916). 
12 - “It is the general rule that a drawee bank is liable to the true payee of a check, which it has certified at his 
instance, if it pays out the money under a forged or unauthorized indorsement of his name, unless the payee is 
precluded, by his ratification, negligence, or facts creating an estoppel, from setting up the forgery or want of 
authority. At its peril, the bank must know that the one to whom it pays such an indorsed check prima facie had 
authority to make the indorsement, and its mere good faith is no defense.” Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 
54 Ga. App. 836, 188 S.E. 589 (1936). 
13 - Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act of The United States of 1896. 
14 - Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 72, Issue 3 495 (2011) at p 
515.    
15 - Id at p 515-16. 
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was not protected from liability by the mere fact that s/he performed on behalf of his principal 
and that s/he reasonably, although mistakenly, believed that the principal had been legitimately 
in possession of the property. Because a forged indorsement does not transfer any rights to the 
indorsee,16 a principal had no power to transfer a fraudulently indorsed negotiable instrument to 
his broker for disposition,17 and the broker obtains no power to carry a good title. Accordingly, a 
broker who innocently sold a negotiable instrument over a forged indorsement was fully liable 
for conversion to a real owner, even though the broker has transferred the proceeds to the 
principal. 18 In Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank,19 the court held that an agent who 
wrongfully converts another's property, or who assists his principal in so doing, is personally 
liable for conversion, even though he commits the act in good faith, in ignorance of the owner’s 
rights and obedience to the command of his principal, and although he realizes nothing out of the 
transaction. If he knowingly assists his principal in converting another’s property, he is liable.20 
However, courts developed an exception for a broker who dealt with negotiable securities 
in a bearer form. When a broker sold stolen bearer bonds and remitted the proceeds of the sale to 
the principal in good faith, the courts refused to find the broker liable for conversion to the real 
owner.21 The legal justification for this exception was dual. First, the real owner of bearer bonds 
has no outstanding rights against the broker since the bearer bonds move between people such as 
cash and the title pass by delivery alone.22 Second, the courts found that the broker as an agent 
acquires a valid title and was protected from suit in conversion because the bonds were in bearer 
form and purchased from the broker in good faith. The reason for the defense of good faith, as 
New York appeals court held, is that the public policy does not demand the imposition of a cruel 
rule of liability on an innocent broker selling bearer bonds.23 The broker, as the innocent 
conductive of valid bonds, should also be afforded such protection. The court recognized that 
                                                          
16 - “When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is 
wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument.” NIL Section 23. 
17 - “A forged indorsement transfers no rights. Therefore, when the principal took possession of the instrument 
without the true payee’s indorsement took no right to the instrument and, so, had no authority to transfer title to his 
agent.” NIL Section 23. 
18 - Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 23 Tenn. App. 20, 126 S.W.2d 359 (1938); Also, “A purchase, in 
good faith, from one who has no title and no right to transfer the property, will not constitute a defense. Even an 
auctioneer or broker who sells property for one who has no title, and pays over to his principal the proceeds, with no 
knowledge of the defect of the title or want of authority, is held to be liable for its conversion to the real owner.” 
State v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 66 Neb. 857, 93 N.W. 319 (1903) at 869-70. 
19 - Fidelity & Deposit Co. 126 S.W.2d 359. 
20 - Fidelity & Deposit Co., 126 S.W.2d at 363.  
21 - “An action for the conversion of interest coupons of United States bonds payable to bearer cannot be maintained 
by the owner from whom they were stolen where the defendant in good faith received them as an agent in exchange, 
and without gross negligence from a party to the theft, and paid the proceeds to his employer, receiving no benefit 
himself, and without any notice from the plaintiff.” Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503 (1869) at 508; “The true test 
is not whether compensation is received for the act which works the conversion of the negotiable security, or 
whether it was gratuitous. It is whether the transaction was entered upon in ignorance of the bearer's want of title, or 
any circumstances sufficient to put a reasonably cautious and prudent man upon inquiry, the ignoring of which 
amounts to proof of bad faith.” Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918) at 663. 
22 - “Bonds, being negotiable, pass by delivery, and the transferee to whom they are sold, who takes them for value 
and in good faith, obtains a good title as against the real owner. It would seem strange if the broker, who is thus the 
conduit of a valid title, should be held responsible for a conversion although he acted in the same good faith as the 
purchaser.” First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941). 
23 - "The harshness of such a rule has been recognized by the courts in repudiating his liability. Public policy does 
not demand the extension of liability for innocent acts to such a case. " Gruntal, 173 N.E. at 684.  
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these bonds were readily transferable and should remain the same without setting unreasonable 
risk on individuals dealing with negotiable papers.24  
It might look like the defense of good faith was allowed only to the broker who is dealing 
with investment securities. However, the specific court decisions foster the rule to mean that the 
defense was even available when dealing with all forms of negotiable papers.25 
 
3. Depositary Bank’s Liability 
 Liability of depositary banks under the pre-U.C.C. was different from the unique 
treatment of brokers dealing with bearer bonds. The innocent broker who sold stolen personal 
bonds is liable to the real owner for conversion if s/he acted in negligence or bad faith.26 
However, a depositary bank is liable for conversion or for money had and received to the owner 
of the instrument27 regardless whether the bank has cashed or accepted for deposit an instrument 
over a forged or an unauthorized indorsement in good faith and according to reasonable 
commercial standards. Also, the bank is liable for conversion regardless whether the bank has 
paid the proceeds to the forger.28 The real owner of an instrument that bears an unauthorized or 
                                                          
24 - “An innocent holder, appropriating or disposing of stolen property, is liable for conversion. Both at common law 
and under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a holder in due course of negotiable paper takes good title even from a 
thief. As to stock certificates, United States government bonds, payable to bearer, and like bonds of corporations, 
circulate to-day as freely as money; title passes by delivery. A broker accepting such securities for disposition on 
behalf of a customer has little or no means of warning or inquiry such as indorsements or other relationships might 
suggest. The securities pass from hand to hand by delivery. He is a mere conduit between the seller and the 
purchaser, for which he receives a small commission. The purchaser is not liable for conversion, yet the broker, 
acting without any ground for suspicion, is said to be liable for the full value of the security which he has sold, 
although he has paid the purchase money over to the seller. The harshness of such a rule has been recognized by the 
courts in repudiating his liability. Public policy does not demand the extension of liability for innocent acts to such a 
case.” Gruntal, 173 N.E. at 684. 
25 - “To defeat the rights of one dealing with negotiable securities it is not enough to show that he took them under 
circumstances which ought to excite the suspicion of a prudent man and cause him to make inquiry, but that he had 
actual knowledge of an infirmity or defect, or of such facts that his failure to make further inquiry would indicate a 
deliberate desire on his part to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that investigation would disclose a vice 
in the transaction. This test, that of good faith with respect to negotiable instruments, is prescribed alike at common 
law, by the Negotiable Instruments Law of 1901.” First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 317 A.2d 377 (1941) at 
340; See also Benton C. Tolley, Depository Bank Liability under 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 676 (1974) at p 682 and note 31.  
26 - Spooner,102 Mass. 503; Pratt, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661; Gruntal, 468, 173 N.E. 682 (N.Y. 1930); First 
Nat'l Bank, 340 Pa. 317 A.2d 377.  
27 - “A collecting bank which accepts a check on a forged indorsement acquires no title and holds the proceeds of the 
check, when collected from the drawee bank, for the payee or rightful owner, who may recover from the collecting 
bank as for money had and received, even though it has fully paid over and accounted for the same to the forger 
without knowledge or suspicion of the forgery; such rule being based upon the theory of the payee’s ratification of 
the collection of the check from the drawee.” Chemical Workers Basic Union, 411 S.W.2d 162; See also, “The bank 
acquires no title to either the check or its proceeds, but holds such check or its proceeds for the payee, who may 
elect to ratify the collection and hold the discounting [collecting] bank in an action for money had and received, or 
in an action for conversion.” Fabricon Products v. United California Bank, 264 Cal. App. 2d 113, 70 Cal. Rptr. 50 
(1968). 
28 - “If a negotiable instrument having a forged indorsement come to the hands of a bank and is collected by it, the 
proceeds are held for the rightful owners of the paper, and may be recovered by them, although the bank gave value 
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forged indorsement could sue the depositary bank that cashed his instrument or deposited it into 
the forger’s account under two different legal justifications. The owner could sue either for 
conversion29 or for money had and received.30 
a. Recovery for Conversion 
 The justification behinds allowing the real owner of an instrument to sue for conversion31 
is that a depositary bank in receiving an instrument from a person who is not the owner obtains 
no title to the instrument. Since the forger depositing an instrument has no right to the 
instrument, the depositary bank retains on power over the instrument. The initial preparation of 
the instrument confirms the payee, the validity of the check, and the scope of the order to pay.32 
Therefore, after the depositary bank collected the instrument and credited the amount to the 
forger’s account, the bank necessarily presupposed dominion over the instrument. The bank’s 
authority over the instrument is conflicted with the real owner’s right to control his property 
which means that the depositary bank converted the instrument.  
The depositary bank is not able to succeed if it alleged that it has acted in good faith and 
according to rational commercial standards. The real owner need only show that s/he is the 
owner of the instrument and has the right to possess the instrument of its proceeds at the time the 
depositary bank converted it. Therefore, if the facts were real, the owner of the converted 
instrument is entitled to the remedy from the depositary bank. For instance, the appeals court of 
Missouri held that “the deposit for collection of an instrument bearing a forged signature confers 
no rights on the bank of deposit; therefore, the person defrauded by the collection of the 
instrument may sue the collecting bank for the proceeds of the collection on the theory that the 
bank was a converter, that it received the proceeds for the use of the one entitled to the 
instrument, that the one paying the instrument relied on the collecting bank's warranty of prior 
indorsements, or that it was negligent in undertaking the collection without exercising the proper 
degree of diligence in ascertaining the genuineness of all signatures and the identity of its 
customers.” 33 
The amount that the owner could recover from suing for conversion against a person who 
took it unlawfully is its face value.34 
                                                          
for the paper, or has paid over the proceeds to the party depositing the instrument for collection.” National Union 
Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449, 129 A. 688 (1925). 
29 - Gruntal v. National Surety Co., 254 N.Y. at 684 
30 - National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co. at 690. 
31 - The term conversion has been defined as “any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one’s property, 
in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it.” Good Rd. Mach. Co. v. Broadway Bank, 267 S.W. 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1924). 
32 - “The validity of a check, the scope of the order to pay, and the person authorized by the drawer to receive 
payment are fixed at the inception of the instrument. And the damages for the conversion of a promissory note, 
bond, or other negotiable instrument is prima facie its face value.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lindell Trust Co., 
348 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). 
33 - Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 348 S.W.2d at 561.  
34 - “Personal property includes chooses in action such as notes, bills, checks and other representatives of value; for 
a representative of value is itself a thing of value. A check is so regarded. The measure of damages is prima facie the 
face value of the paper converted.” Good Rd. Mach. Co. 267 S.W. 40 at 7; Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport 
Ave. Bank, 191 Mo. App. 287, 177 S.W. 1092 (1915); Bennett v. Tower Grove Bank & Tr. Co., 325 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1959). 
11 
 
b. Recovery for Money had and received35 
 The owner of an instrument could sue for money had and received a depositary bank if 
the latter cashed or accepted for deposit an instrument over an unauthorized or forged 
indorsement.36 An action for “money had and received” recovers money that should not in 
justice be retained by a depositary bank and which in equity and good conscience the depositary 
bank should return it to the real owner. The right to recover does not rely upon privity of contract 
but on the obligation to restore which the law implies “should be returned” when a person is 
unjustly enriched at another’s expense.37 Under the theory of money had and received, the reason 
to hold a depositary bank liable for cashing or accepting for deposit an instrument over a forged 
indorsement is that the bank kept the proceeds of the collection in the same way for the real 
owner as it had initially held the instrument. In the implied relationship, the depositary bank 
became the real owner’s agent and agreed to be bound by the terms of the instrument, and 
created an obligation on the part of the bank to pay the proceeds only to the real owner. 38 
                                                          
35 - 2 Henry J Bailey & Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady On Bank Checks ¶ 30.03[1] (Revised ed. 1998). 
36 - “Where a check or draft drawn upon a bank has been fraudulently raised or altered after it was drawn, money 
which has been paid by a bank upon such a fraudulently raised or altered check may be recovered back from the 
party to whom it was paid, in an action for money had and received, on the ground that the payment was without 
consideration and made by mistake. The fact that the bank on which it was drawn has certified the check after the 
change has been made is not conclusive against such bank, nor does it preclude it from showing the fact of such 
alteration, nor prevent a recovery from the party who received the check on the faith and credit of the certification 
alone.” Metro. Nat'l Bank v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 182 Ill. 367, 55 N.E. 360 (1899); Reynolds v. Title Guar. Tr. 
Co., 196 Mo. App. 21, 189 S.W. 33 (1916). 
37 - Rabinowitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 235 Mass. 103, 126 N.E. 289 (1920); Another definition of money had and 
received: “Where one man has in his hands money, which, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, 
belongs to and ought to be paid to another, this is the proper form of action for its recovery. If, then, at the 
commencement of this suit, the defendant held money, which ex aequo et bono he ought not to have retained from 
the plaintiffs, they are entitled to recover.” Wiseman v. Lyman, 7 Mass. 286 (1811); Also, “Most of the leading cases 
which permit recovery upon the contract theory recognize the conversion but go on to reason beyond the conversion. 
It is said if the collecting bank, while it is in possession of a check which it has converted, by means of the forged or 
unauthorized indorsement collects on it from the bank upon which it is drawn (drawee), then the collecting bank 
holds the proceeds of the collection in the same way for the payee as it held the check, and that relationship creates a 
privity between the collecting bank and the payee. If under these circumstances the payee elects to ratify the 
collection of the check by the collecting bank, he may recover from it the amount collected as for money had and 
received without regard to any question of good faith, or of notice or knowledge or duty of inquiry, notwithstanding 
the fact that the collecting bank may have parted with the money in good faith.” E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank of 
New York, 176 A.D. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (App. Div. 1917). 
38 - “When the bank took the check for collection, it became the payee's agent and agreed to be bound by the terms 
of the check. One obligation derived from the terms of the instrument required the bank’s payment of the check 
proceeds to the true payee only. As a consequence, it was the breach of this obligation which gave rise to the money 
had and received cause of action.” Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847 
(1966).   
 Also, “Stated in other words, a collecting bank is said to be merely an agent for the purpose of collecting 
from the drawee bank the proceeds of the check delivered to it. When it takes the check for collection, it assents to 
the agency and becomes bound by the terms of the instrument received. Those terms include an obligation to pay the 
proceeds collected to the true payee owner in the absence of a valid indorsement. The moment the collecting bank 
receives the proceeds it holds money belonging to the owner of the check and becomes a debtor of such owner and 
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However, a necessary pre-requisite (ratification) imposed to allow courts to imply the transfer of 
the proceeds to the real owner39. The actual owner must ratify the depositary bank’s collection of 
the proceeds from the payor bank.40 Since a payor bank could only pay out its depositary’s 
money consistent with the depositor’s order, the owner could not claim that the proceeds 
collected by the depositary bank are his proceeds unless the owner ratifies the depositary bank’s 
collection from the payor bank.41 Therefore, when an owner of an instrument begins an action 
for money had and received, the act of suing a depositary bank is ratification to the transfer of 
the proceeds by the payer bank to the depositary bank.42 Thus, ratifying a depositary bank’s 
collection affords an owner of an instrument the right to recover the amount of the proceeds from 
the depositary bank regardless of acting in good faith43, knowledge, or duty of inquiry.44 The 
depositary bank is liable to recover the real owner the full amount of the proceeds regardless 
whether the bank has retained the proceeds or cashed them out to the forger.45   
                                                          
of no one else, in the absence of a valid indorsement.” Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 
N.E.2d 117 (1951). 
39 - “Where the payee in an action alleging conversion by a collecting bank by accepting a check containing a forged 
conversion elects to recover from a collecting bank for money had and received, a payee's ratification of the 
collection by an intervening bank operates to cut off recourse against a drawer of a check on an original demand, 
and to supply authority to collect which an intervening bank lacked. A payee's act of ratifying collection of a check 
for it also ratifies an assumed payment of a check, and both a drawer and a drawee of a check are released from 
paying it over again, because a payee, by ratifying a payment, is estopped from making a claim against either.” 
Mackey-Woodard, Inc., 419 P.2d at 855. 
40 - “Ratification is one of the characteristic rights that a principal may exercise in respect of the actions of his agent. 
It is said if a collecting bank, while it is in possession of a check which it has converted, by means of a forged or 
unauthorized indorsement collects on it from a bank upon which it is drawn, then a collecting bank holds the 
proceeds of the collection in the same way for a payee as it held the check, and that relationship creates a privity 
between a collecting bank and a payee. If under these circumstances a payee elects to ratify a collection of a check 
by a collecting bank, he may recover from it the amount collected as for money had and received without regard to 
any question of good faith, or of notice or knowledge or duty of inquiry, notwithstanding the fact that a collecting 
bank may have parted with the money in good faith.” 
41 - “The act of suing the depositary bank meant that the drawee and the drawer released from paying it over again.” 
Mackey-Woodard, Inc., 419 P.2d at 854. 
42 - “Where the payee in cases of this type elects to recover from the collecting bank for money had and received, the 
payee's ratification of the collection by the intervening bank operates to cut off recourse against the drawer of the 
check on the original demand, and to supply the authority to collect which the intervening bank lacked. The payee's 
act of ratifying the collection of the check for it also ratifies the assumed payment of the check, and both the drawer 
and the drawee of the check are released from paying it over again, because the payee, by ratifying the payment, is 
estopped from making a claim against either.” Mackey-Woodard, Inc., 419 P.2d at 855.  
43 - “The true owner of a check, with a forged unauthorized indorsement may ratify the act of a bank, in receiving it, 
in that condition; and collecting the proceeds or paying them out without authority and yet not ratify the forged or 
unauthorized indorsement. In such cases the bank cannot avoid liability by showing that its conduct was governed 
by good faith and the payee is entitled to recover unless he has been guilty of fraud or negligence in the matter.” 
Schaap v. State Nat'l Bank, 137 Ark. 251, 208 S.W. 309 (1918). 
44 - “It is no defense to a collecting bank that it has fully paid over and accounted for the proceeds of a check, which 
it collected from a drawee bank, to the forger or unauthorized indorser without knowledge or suspicion of the 
forgery or unauthorized indorsement in a suit by a payee for money had and received. A payee under these 
circumstances has an election of remedies to proceed either in tort or in contract against a collecting bank. If the 
payee elects to waive its remedy for a conversion, and prosecute an action to recover for the proceeds of the checks 
as for money had and received, it would be an irrevocable election whereby a payee would be confined to a remedy 
which it thus elected to prosecute.” Mackey-Woodard, Inc., 419 P.2d at 854.  
45 - “If a negotiable instrument having a forged indorsement come to the hands of a bank, and is collected by it, the 
proceeds are held for the rightful owners of the paper, and may be recovered by them, although the bank gave value 
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 Depositary banks are entirely liable under both the conversion and the contract theories 
irrespective of any defenses founded in good faith, following reasonable commercial standards, 
or the absence of proceeds in the bank’s hands. The depositary bank thereon treated as any agent 
who mistakenly, although innocently, converted the personal property of another owner. 
However, courts did not extend the protection of the broker who sold stolen bearer bonds to 
include depositary banks where a forged indorsement was involved. However, U.C.C. Article 3, 
has altered the liability of depositary banks for cashing or accepting instruments over an 
unauthorized or forged indorsement.   
 
III. The Depositary Bank’s Liability under old § 3-419(3) 
The Uniform Commercial Code (1952) under § 3-419(3) altered the former rules regarding 
depositary banks’ liability on cashing or accepting for deposit instruments over an unauthorized 
or a forged indorsement. Examining the alteration of depositary banks’ liability, its new elements 
under § 3-419(3), and the courts’ reaction to the subsection will show the reasons that drove the 
legislatures to the recent amendment of the subsection in 1990. This Chapter discusses first the 
defense that subsection 3-419(3) afforded depositary banks to absolve of liability for dealing 
with an instrument bearing an unauthorized or a forged indorsement and second, the court’s 
response to the new defense and the alteration of the pre-U.C.C. legal doctrines. Last, the 
Chapter examines whether the courts’ approaches were a proper reason that led to the 
amendment of section 3-419.The depositary bank’s defense under old § 3-419(3) 
After the adoption of the U.C.C. by all 50 states, the recovery from the depositary bank 
governed by Article 3, old § 3-419(3). Which seemingly altered the status of depositary bank 
liability when the depositary bank cashes an instrument from a person who is not entitled to 
enforce it or obtains its payment from the drawee bank. Old § 3-419(3) provided an absolute 
defense to a depositary bank cashing, taking by transfer other than a negotiation, obtaining 
payment, or receiving payment on forged instruments if the depositary bank acted in good faith 
and according to reasonable commercial standards.46 Thus, the defense protected depositary 
banks from liability for conversion to the actual owner of the instrument. However, the only 
liability the bank may bear is the extent of the instrument’s proceeds which might still be within 
the bank’s money.47 
 The language of old § 3-419(3) seemingly requires that when a depositary bank acts 
honestly and in a commercially reasonable manner, but no longer has the proceeds of the check, 
                                                          
for the paper, or has paid over the proceeds to the party depositing the instrument for collection.” United States 
Portland Cement Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 61 Colo. 334, 157 P. 202 (1916); Home Indem. Co. v. State Bank 
of Fort Dodge, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943). 
46 - U.C.C. (1963) § 1-201(20) - Good faith means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.  
47  U.C.C. (1963) § 3-419(3): “Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a 
representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the 
reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or its 
proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner 
beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.” 
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it is not liable for conversion or otherwise48 to the real owner.49 The determination of a 
depositary bank’s ability to use the defense under old § 3-419(3) measured by the care exercised 
by a bank and location of the proceeds. While, as discussed previously, a pre-U.C.C. judicial 
determination would hold a depositary bank liable for conversion or contract had and received 
regardless of care exercised or the location of the proceeds.50 Pre-U.C.C., the defense of 
exercising ordinary care and controlling the proceeds of the instrument was only available to the 
broker dealing with bearer bonds; later, the legislatures of U.C.C. made the defense possible to 
depositary banks. Although the justification of the broker defense came from the general rules of 
agent liability, reading the comments to 3-419 indicates that the purpose that led the legislatures 
of the U.C.C. to extend the protection to depositary banks is that the legislatures considered a 
depositary bank as a representative deserves identical protection as an innocent broker.51 Other 
sources suggest that this new language was added to appease the banking community by 
expanding the traditional broker rule to absolve depositary bank.52  
1. Courts’ reaction to the defense of § 3-419(3) 
 Since the owner of an instrument, in the absence of proceeds in the bank’s hand, must 
prove that the depositary bank did not act in good faith and according to the reasonable 
commercial standards, legal actions against depositary banks became harder.53 However, courts 
have taken a creative approach to interpreting former § 3-419(3) in a way to find  liability in 
depositary banks’ activities regarding forged instruments. In making this approach, these courts 
focused on the terms “representative,” “proceeds remaining” and “adherence to reasonable 
commercials standards.” 
The Pennsylvania appeals court in Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit & Trust Co.,54 the 
California supreme court in Cooper v. Union Bank,55 and the Michigan court of appeal in 
Sherriff-Goslin Co. v. Cawood,56 were the first cases that encouraged the amendment of old § 3-
419(3).57 In these cases, courts interpreted the language of the subsection in a way to justify that 
                                                          
48 - The phrase “or otherwise” implies that all theories of recovery which applied under pre-U.C.C. (1963) legal 
doctrine shall continue to apply, subject to the old § 3-419(3) defense. 
49 - Old § 3-419(3). 
50 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 685 
51 - Julian B. McDonnell, Bank Liability for Fraudulent Checks: The Clash of the Utilitarian and Paternalist Creeds 
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Geo. L. J. 1399 (1985) at p 1413.  
52 -  Barbara Singer, Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-419 and the Battle to Preserve a Payee's Right to Sue 
Directly a Depositary or Collecting Bank That Pays on a Forged Indorsement, 15 Seton Hall Legis. J. 39. (1991) at p 
55-65; Tolley, supra note 25, at p 686. 
53 - “An order of dismissal as to the conversion claims brought against a bank are to be affirmed insofar as it relates 
to drafts issued by the various insurance companies herein, because no conversion liability lies against a bank under 
old § 419(1)(c).”  Larkin General Hospital, Ltd. v. Bank of Florida, 464 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
54  - 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (C.P. 1965). 
55 - 9 Cal.3d 123 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973). 
56 - 91 Mich. App. 204, 283 N.W.2d 691 (1979). 
57 - Frederick Miller & Alvin Harrell, The Law of Modern Payment Systems, West Academic Publishing (2nd ed 
2017) at p 338. 
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old § 3-419(3) did not amend the standards of depositary bank liability pre-U.C.C.58 Therefore, 
the examination of these decisions will show how the courts provided the owner of the 
instrument with a sound legal basis to avoid the old § 3-419(3) defense. In Ervin, the appeals 
court of Pennsylvania held that a depository bank who cashed an instrument and forwarded for 
collection is not representative. The Michigan court of appeal citing policy considerations 
justified its holding by saying that a direct suit against a depositary bank avoids circuitous 
litigation. Finally, the California supreme court in Cooper rejected the defenses of old § 3-419(3) 
on a basis that the depositary bank has not parted with the proceeds of the checks. 
a. The depository bank is not a representative: 
 The Pennsylvania appeals court decision represents the earliest reported case which 
interpreted the language of old § 3-419 differently (3). An employee of Ervin “the plaintiff” took 
checks payable to Ervin 59 and forged the indorsement of Ervin then got them paid by the 
defendant bank. After paying the checks, the defendant bank forwarded them to the payer bank 
and got the amount of its payment to the forger.  
Accordingly, Ervin as the real owner of the checks sued the defendant bank for 
conversion. The defendant bank objected alleging the defense in old § 3-419(3) to Ervin’s 
complaint. Notwithstanding the language of former § 3-419(3), the appeals court decided to 
overrule the defendant bank’s demurrer, holding that the defense was not applicable. The appeals 
court understood the law to be in the same manner as pre-U.C.C. 
 In overruling the defendant bank’s demurrer, the Pennsylvania appeals court stated that 
when a depositary bank cashes a check over a forged indorsement, a different principle applies. 
The depositary bank cashes a check on a forged indorsement acquires no title whatever to the 
checks because the indorsement, its only source of title, is a nullity. The bank, therefore, is 
wrongfully in possession of the check and equity and good conscience holds the check for the 
real owner. If the bank, while in possession of it, used the forged indorsement to collect its 
proceeds, then the bank holds the proceeds for the real owner, and that relationship creates 
privity between the bank and the real owner. Moreover, if the real owner elects to ratify the 
collection of the check by the collecting bank, the real owner may recover from the bank the 
amount collected.60 
The appeals court cited Nat'l Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co.61, in which the note-writer 
has collected the cases from some 30 jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania (more than half of 
which have adopted the U.C.C) on the question with which we are here concerned, and the 
conclusion reached in that note, at page 672, is that: 
“The rule is established by the great weight of authority that in the absence of negligence, 
laches, or estoppel, a real payee or a check owner is entitled to recover against a collecting bank 
or any person, cashing a check bearing a forged or unauthorized indorsement of the real payee, 
and procuring payment thereof from the drawer of the check. The reasoning on which these cases 
                                                          
58 - Irvin M. Weinstein, Section 3-419(3) of the U.C.C. Does Not Limit the Liability of a Depositary Bank to the True 
Owner of a Check Paid on a Forged Indorsement, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 104 (Jan,1974).   
59 - Payable to order means to be paid only to a specific payee, old § 3-109(b). 
60 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 480. 
61 - 148 Md. 449, 129 A. 688 (1925).  
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proceed can perhaps be summed up in the statement that one who cashes a check on a forged or 
unauthorized indorsement does so at his peril.”62 
Moreover, the appeals court cited 9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking § 357 c: (1938), and 10 Am. 
Jur. 2d Banks 599, § 632 (1963), which says that “the general rule established by nearly all 
courts is that a bank who has obtained possession of a check upon an unauthorized or forged 
indorsement of the real payee’s signature, and has collected the amount of the check from the 
payor bank, is liable for the proceeds thereof to the payee or other owner, notwithstanding they 
have been paid to the person from whom the check was obtained, and notwithstanding that his 
employee or agent forged the payee's signature.”63 
The defendant bank contended that old § 3-419(3) modified the pre-U.C.C. rules to the 
extent that a depositary bank who on good faith pays the proceeds of the checks to the person 
presenting them, it is now relieved from liability. The appeals court did not understand the law to 
be changed in this manner by the code section 3-419. 
The appeals court stated that § 3-419(3) was intended to foster the rule of decisions 
which have held that a representative who deals with an instrument for his principal in good faith 
is not liable for conversion or otherwise to the real owner unless that he will be obliged to pay 
over any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his hands.64 
Also, the appeals court stated that the leading case in Pennsylvania which is said to be in 
accord with this section of the code, and which was decided long before the adoption of the code 
with this new section in Pennsylvania, is First National Bank of Blairstown v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 
337 (1941). In which the court held that no liability on a broker or agent assisted another in the 
sale of stolen negotiable bonds, where all of the proceeds had been turned over to the principal, 
and the broker or agent had acted throughout guiltlessly, and in good faith. 
The court recognized that the subsection included depositary banks within its broader 
concept of “representative,” but the clear meaning is to include them only when the banks are 
acting as a “representative” which is the clear meaning of the subsection relying on old §1-
201(35) that defined the term “representative.”65 
Also, the appeals court stated that the language of old § 3-419(3) does not include the 
activities of negotiating or honoring of a check when the subsection refers to a “representative” 
who dealt with an instrument or its proceeds as a representative of a client who was not the real 
owner.66 Whereas, if the depositary bank cashed the check over the counter and after that 
received the proceeds from the payer bank, the bank in fact paid using its own money, and the 
bank and real owner enter into a debtor-creditor relationship.67  
                                                          
62 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 480. 
63 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 481.  
64 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 482.  
65 - U.C.C. (1963) §1-201(35): “Representative” includes an agent, an officer of a corporation or association, and a 
trustee, executor or administrator of an estate, or any other person empowered to act for another. 
66 - The entire subsection speaks of something other than the negotiating or the honoring of a check when it refers to 
the representative having “dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner.” 
Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 483. 
67 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d.2d at 484. 
17 
 
Consequently, the appeals court held that the depositary bank is subject to the pre-U.C.C. 
doctrines of liability.68 The appeals court said that when the depositary bank purchased or cashed 
the checks over the forged indorsement drawn on other banks, the depositary bank virtually used 
its own money, and then, in putting the checks through for collection, it obtained from the 
drawee bank money which belongs to the real payee. Thus, after collecting the check, the 
depositary bank is still holding the proceeds of the checks for the interest of the real payee.69 The 
court read old § 3-419(3) narrowly, finding that the depositary bank was not acting as a 
representative of the real payee after the final payment to the forger. The depositary bank is not 
acting as a representative under old § 4-201(1)70 at the time of the conversion, because the 
depositary bank paid the checks within the meaning of old § 4-213(1)71 before collecting the 
proceeds. Therefore, the final payment to the forger prevented the depositary bank from being in 
the position of the representative which allows the bank to use § 3-419(3) as a defense. In other 
words, if a depositary bank cashes, or accepts a check for deposit and later allows the forger to 
withdraw its proceeds, the depositary bank is not an agent, and that is because the bank made a 
final payment before collecting the check.72 
However, the appeals court’s reasoning does not stand on its legal analysis.73 The basic 
failure in the court's analysis comes from its total disregard of the condition of depositary banks 
as agents under § 3-419(3) while collecting negotiable instruments. Thence, the court denied the 
defense to the depositary bank on the assumption that the legislatures provided the defense under 
old § 3-419(3) to depositary banks when they deal with instruments as representatives. However, 
the legislative history shows nothing to support the court contention.74 The language of old § 4-
20175 seems to establish without question that the purpose of old § 3-419(3) was to protect the 
depositary bank while acting as a representative for collection even if the bank made a 
provisional settlement over a forged indorsement. The U.C.C. limited the defense of old § 3-
419(3) to situations in which a depositary bank is initially an agent but does not require the 
depositary bank to be a representative at the time the plaintiff sued for conversion. This 
construction backed by the language of the subsection 3-419(3), which reads “a representative, 
including a depositary bank.” Thus, a depositary bank initially must act as a representative in 
accepting the check for negotiation over a forged indorsement to rely on the old § 3-419(3) 
defense. Reading the Code's use of the term “representative” as the appeals court read would 
require a depositary bank to be a representative at the time the payee sues for conversion. That 
would make the subsection useless because final payment within the meaning of old section 4-
213 generally occurs before the time a real payee sues for conversion.76 Each regular check 
                                                          
68 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 483. 
69 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 483,84. 
70 - Old § 4-201. (1) “Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and prior to the time that a settlement given by a 
collecting bank for an item is or becomes final (subsection (3) of Section 4-211 and Sections 4-212 and 4-213) the 
bank is an agent or sub-agent of the owner of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional.” 
71 - Old § 4-213. (1)(a) “An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the following, 
whichever happens first: (a) paid the item in cash ....” 
72 - Frederick J. Jr. Murphy, supra note 8, at p 369. 
73 - Ervin was criticized. See Tolley, supra note 25, at p 688. 
74 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 688. 
75 - Old § 4-201(1).  
76 - Frederick J. Jr. Murphy, supra note 8, at p 376. 
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cashing transaction is different from a situation in which a bank accepts an instrument over a 
forged indorsement and pays cash because old § 4-201(1) presumes an agency status when a 
depositary bank accepts a check for deposit, collection, or payment. Despite wrong 
indorsements, the representative requirement does not limit the scope of the defense in the forged 
indorsement transaction.77 
Moreover, the official comment indicates an obvious intent on the part of the legislatures 
to treat a depositary bank as a representative in this regard.78 Further, there is no basis to 
conclude from the official comment to old § 3-419(3) that the agency status is not applicable 
when the depositary bank sued in conversion.79 Thus, when the Pennsylvania court held that the 
depositary bank did not act as a representative when the bank did collect the check over the 
forged indorsement, the court fostered an interpretation obviously in contradiction with the 
language of 4-201.80  
b. Avoid circulation 
In restricting old § 3-419(3), The Michigan court of appeals in Sherriff-Goslin Co. v. 
Cawood,81 citing policy considerations, permitted the real payee to directly sue the depositary 
bank for conversion if the bank took instruments bearing forged indorsements.82 The appeals 
court of Michigan held that the defense in old § 3-419(3) is not granted to a depositary bank in a 
suit for conversion, regardless of whether the bank acted in good faith or within a standard of 
commercial reasonableness. The Michigan court justified its holding by saying that a direct suit 
against the depositary bank avoids circuitous litigation. The defendant contended that it is not 
liable in a direct suit by the real payee and relied on § 3-419(3) for support. However, the appeals 
court overruled the defendant bank’s contention relying on the Code’s allocation of the ultimate 
loss in a forged indorsement. The defendant bank here accepted for collection 300 checks drawn 
by various entities on many different banks. If the real payee cannot sue the depository bank 
directly, it would be necessary to sue either the drawee bank under old § 3-419(1)(c) or the 
drawer under old 3-804. Thus, instead of starting 300 lawsuits against multiple banks, one suit 
will do under the prevailing construction of old section 3-419. Also, in case of allowing the 300 
lawsuits, the matter would not be closed. After the real payee recovers from the drawee bank or 
drawer, the latter, in turn, will pass the loss to the first party who dealt with the forger, here the 
defendant bank, under the warranty provisions of old 3-417.83 
                                                          
77 - Id at page 367-77. 
78 - "The presumption of agency "applies regardless of the form of indorsement or lack of indorsement and 
even though credit given for the item is subject to immediate withdrawal as of right or is in fact withdrawn". Old § 
4-201. Comment 1. 
79 - Old § 3-419. Comment (5). Subsection (3), which is new, is intended to adopt the rule of decisions which has 
held that a representative, such as a broker or depositary bank, who deals with a negotiable instrument for his 
principal in good faith is not liable to the true owner for conversion of the instrument or otherwise, except that he 
may be compelled to turn over to the true owner the instrument itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in 
his hands. The provisions of subsection 
80 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 688; Henry J Bailey, The Law of Bank Checks § 15.14, at 496-501 (The Banking Law 
Journal. ed,.3rd ed. 1962). 
81 - Sherriff-Goslin Co., 283 N.W.2d 691. 
82 - Medessa Cook Montgomery, Conversion Liability of the Depositary Bank under U.C.C. Section 3-419(3), 94 
Com. L.J. (1989) at p 207; See also, Singer, supra note 52, at p 86.  
83 - Sherriff-Goslin Co., 204, 283 N.W.2d at 693-94. 
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The Michigan appeals court suggested that direct action by a real payee against a 
depositary bank would reduce circuitous litigation to single suit and ensure judicial efficiency. 
The direct action of conversion will transfer the loss to the party on whom the loss will 
ultimately lie. Otherwise, the real owner must sue the drawee bank, who will then sue the 
depositary bank on its presentment warranties. These policy reasons are likable, but they should 
not operate to exceed the language and the intent underlying old 3-419. Certainly, the drafters 
were cognizant of these common law policy reasons when they drafted old § 3-419(3). The Code 
prevented the depositary bank from citing the drawer's negligence in contributing to the forgery 
as a defense to the payee’s conversion suit if the depositary bank was negligent.84 Therefore, the 
depositary bank will bear the loss alone even with the negligence of other parties. Putting a 
depositary bank in this position is more harmful than merely foreclosing one of three possible 
defendants that a real payee may choose when suing for conversion based on an unauthorized or 
forged indorsement.85 
c. The depositary bank has not parted with the proceeds 
In 1973, the supreme court of California in Cooper v. Union Bank severely restricted the 
availability of the old § 3-419(3) defense to depositary banks. The court made the defense 
inapplicable unless an evidence such as the owner’s negligence which prevents the owner of the 
instrument from alleging conversion. Cooper was a joint attorney whose secretary has forged his 
name and signature, as indorser, on numerous checks, and then cashed the checks over a period 
of approximately one and one-half years. Cooper’s secretary embezzled about twenty-nine 
checks of Cooper and forged the necessary indorsements, cashed some of these checks at the 
defendant “Union Bank” while depositing others to her accounts at the same bank. Then, Union 
Bank collected all the checks from the payor banks and the forger withdrew the entire amount of 
deposits before the detection of the unauthorized indorsements. 
Cooper sued Union Bank for conversion86 to recover the amounts of the checks handled 
by Union Bank on the forged indorsements. Concerning most of these checks, the trial court held 
that the plaintiff’s negligent supervision of his secretary and his books of account precluded him 
                                                          
84 - Old section 3-406. Comment. 5. “This section does not make the negligent party liable in tort for damages 
resulting from the alteration. Instead, it estops him from asserting it against the holder in due course or drawee. The 
reason is that in the usual case the extent of the loss, which involves the possibility of ultimate recovery from the 
wrongdoer, cannot be determined at the time of litigation, and the decision would have to be made on the 
unsatisfactory basis of burden of proof. The holder or drawee is protected by an estoppel, and the task of pursuing 
the wrongdoer is left to the negligent party. Any amount in fact recovered from the wrongdoer must be held for the 
benefit of the negligent party under ordinary principles of equity.” Old § 4-406. Comment. 4. “even if the bank 
succeeds in establishing that the customer has failed to exercise ordinary care, if in turn the customer succeeds in 
establishing that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in paying the item(s) the preclusion rule does not apply. 
This distribution of the burden of establishing between the customer and the bank provides reasonable equality of 
treatment and requires each person asserting the negligence to establish such negligence rather than requiring either 
person to establish that his entire course of conduct constituted ordinary care.” 
85 -  Frederick J. Jr. Murphy, supra note 8, at p 381. 
86 - The California supreme court stated that the plaintiff's suit was one in conversion, implying that the theory of 
suit was founded in tort law. Cooper, 507 P.2d at 612. However, the court in its analysis applied ratification 
concepts which were distinctive of all pre-U.C.C. contract has and received theory of recovery. Id at 613. A 
plausible explanation for the court's application of ratification where the plaintiff's suit was in conversion lies in the 
fact that the “proceeds” language of old § 3-419(3) demands reliance on ratification. Tolley, supra note 25, at p 689.  
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from alleging that the indorsements were unauthorized. The trial court held that Cooper was 
negligent in not discovering, within a reasonable time, that the forger had been placing the 
unauthorized indorsements of the payees on said checks and obtaining the proceeds of said 
checks for his benefit. Moreover, Cooper negligence virtually contributed to the making of the 
unauthorized indorsements on each of the checks that were accepted and paid after the specific 
period by the respective defendant herein.87 After Cooper had alleged the impropriety of the 
indorsement, the trial court concluded that Union Bank is not liable to pay the amount of the 
checks since the bank acted in good faith, according to reasonable commercial standards, and 
had no proceeds remaining in their hands. In other words, Union Bank was held immune from 
liability and denied recovery relying on the defense provided in old § 3-419(3), limiting recovery 
for conversion only in case the amount of any proceeds remaining is still within the bank's 
control.88  
However, the California supreme court had a different opinion. Regarding the location of 
the proceeds, the California supreme court allowed Cooper to allege the forged indorsement by 
which the court rejected the availability of the defenses under old § 3-419(3) on a ground that the 
Union Bank was found to have retained the proceeds of the checks in its hand.89 
The California supreme court construed the language of old § 3-419(3) in a particular 
manner to find that Union Bank is still retaining the proceeds of the checks. The court relied first 
on the application of the pre-U.C.C. doctrine of ratification. The supreme court established that 
under the dominant theory of bank collection that preceding the code and which the code has left 
consistent, the amounts a drawee bank remits on a forged indorsement to the depositary bank are 
not the proceeds of the checks. It is a consequence of the relationship between a drawee bank and 
the depositor-drawer. The relationship is one of debtor and creditor, in which the drawee bank is 
under an obligation to his client and a commitment to debit the client’s account only at his order. 
Thus, if the drawee bank pays, on a check drawn by its client, any person other than the 
designated payee or the indorsee, the drawee bank’s obligations to the client stays the same. In 
case the drawee bank did debit the client’s account, paying a forged check, the client has the 
right to compel the drawee bank to recredit the account. Since the full amount of the check 
remains in the account of the drawer when the drawee bank pays on a forged indorsement, the 
drawee bank manifestly does not part with the proceeds of the check but merely withdraws other 
funds from its account.90 Consequently, when the real payee brought an action against a 
depositary bank for conversion of a check collected on a forged indorsement, the action is 
deemed to have ratified the collection of the proceeds from the payor bank. This ratification 
conveys the remittance of the funds by the payor bank into an authorized act for which the payor 
bank may debit the drawer’s account.91 However, ratifying the check collection does not 
                                                          
87 - Cooper, 507 P.2d at 613-14.   
88 - Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 916635, John L. Cole, Judge. Cooper, 507 P.2d 609. The California 
official reports summary.  
89 - California Supreme Court hold that the code fails to define the word “proceeds” in the context of bank 
collection. Cooper, 507 P.2d at 609.   
90 - Cooper, 507 P.2d at 616. 
91 - General bank collection theory also instructs us that the true owner, in bringing an action against a collecting 
bank for conversion of a check collected on a forged indorsement, is deemed to have ratified the collection of the 
proceeds from the payor bank. This ratification transmutes the remittance of funds by the payor bank into an 
authorized act for which it may debit its customer's account. In the case at bar, it appears that plaintiffs' action 
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constitute ratification for the depositary banks’ payment to the forger.92 The dominant pre-
U.C.C. established, on the contrary, that the depositary bank held the proceeds at the time the 
real payee filed his suit for conversion because that is the time to be considered ratification for 
the check collection. Subsequently, when the depositary bank collected the proceeds of the 
check, it did that for the benefit of the real payee. The court built its first analyzation that the 
depositary bank payment made on the forged indorsement upon receiving the check does not 
count as a payment by the proceeds of the check, at that moment, the depositary bank paid the 
forger utilizing its own funds.93 Thereon, the court stated that at the time the depositary bank 
took such a check it has obviously not made any prior collection and, thus, has nothing that could 
be considered proceeds yet. The money that the forger received over the counter is, 
consequently, the bank's own money.94 The court’s approach relied on the bank’s balance sheet 
by which the court in determining whether the bank’s assets still inflated because of the payment 
of the check. If the forged check was taken on deposit, with provisional credit, and the credit 
becomes final, and after the collection, the forger withdrew it, then the depositary bank is not 
liable because that did not affect the assets on the bank balance sheet. However, if the depositary 
bank cashed over the counter or, presumably, if the forger withdrew the provisional credit before 
the collection of the check from the payor bank, the depositary bank is liable. The basis of 
depositary bank responsibility came from the idea that the bank still retains the proceeds of the 
check and the bank balance sheet will show the collection as a credit in the bank’s assets. The 
balance sheet will prove that the depositary bank virtually received proceeds from the payor 
bank, and the depositary bank paid the forger before the collection with its own money.95 
Dependently, the supreme court concluded that Union Bank is still retaining the proceeds and 
built on that an agency status between Union Bank and the real payee. The agency status drove 
the court to find that the proceeds merged with the Union Bank’s money. The court illustrated 
that upon the collection of the check, the proceeds of the check merged with Union Bank’s 
general funds and therefore Union Bank retained them. Thus, the court held that upon the 
receiving of the proceeds, Union Bank became a debtor of the real payee.96 After the depositary 
bank cashed the check and, received a final settlement for the check that had forwarded for 
collection, the agency status typically ends, and Union Bank becomes a mere debtor of the real 
                                                          
against defendant collecting banks constitutes such a ratification, and these banks, therefore, must be considered to 
have received the proceeds of the instruments. Cooper, 507 P.2d at 614. 
92 - Cooper, 507 P.2d at 614. 
93 - The California supreme court cited: E. Allan Farnsworth & Fairfax Jr. Leary, U.C.C. Brief No. 10: Forgery and 
Alteration of Checks, 14 Prac. Law. 75, 88 (1968). Cooper, 507 P.2d at 614. 
94 - The California supreme court relied on the balance sheet approach that was mentioned in Farnsworth, supra note 
94, at p 80.  
95 - Farnsworth, supra note 94, at p 79-80.  
96 - California supreme court cited the case: Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 
117 (1951). In which the court held relaying on 9 Corpus Juris Secundum (Banks and Banking, p. 763), “a collecting 
bank is merely an agent for collecting from the drawee bank the proceeds of the check delivered to it. When the 
bank takes the check for collection, it assents to the agency and becomes bound by the terms of the instrument 
received. Those terms include an obligation to pay the proceeds collected to the true payee owner in the absence of a 
valid indorsement. The moment the collecting bank receives the proceeds it holds money belonging to the owner of 
the check and becomes a debtor of such owner and of no one else in the absence of a valid indorsement.” 
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payor.97 As a mere debtor, Union Bank was entitled to mingle the check proceeds with its own.98 
Union Bank, on the contrary, became a debtor, and the proceeds of the check completely merged 
with the bank’s money. The effect of this mingle is that Union Bank deemed to retain the 
proceeds of the check even though the amounts indicated in the check, in the bank’s money, 
were remitted to the forger. The supreme court derived its conclusion by reference to the law of 
constructive trusts.99 The constructive trusts established that money received by a bank and 
mingled with the bank’s funds is traceable by the genuine owner.100 Therefore, the forger 
withdrawal is unaffected so long as the cash that the bank has in its hand is more than the real 
owner's proceeds. Since in Cooper, Union Bank’s money exceeded the amount that indicated in 
the claim, the court held that Cooper has the right to avoid the old § 3-419(3) defense and trace 
the proceeds into Union Bank’s money.101  
Also, the court attempted to support its conclusion that Union Bank did not part with the 
proceeds of the check on the intention of the legislatures of the U.C.C., whether they intended to 
absolve a depositary bank completely from liability by such payment.  The court stated that if the 
legislatures intended to excuse depositary bank in this matter, they definitely would have 
employed language more obvious than that of retaining or parting with proceeds, such as the 
term “for value.” The court compared the depositary bank status to that of a holder in due 
course102 under U.C.C. or a bona fide purchaser under the law of constructive trusts103 since both 
purchase properties and in return pay consideration to the transferor. In the U.C.C., the term of 
                                                          
97 - California Supreme court relied on Justice Cardozo opinion in Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 294 U.S. 216, 55 S. Ct. 394 (1935). Justice Cardozo stated that “ in Indiana in 1931 a statute known as the Bank 
Collection Code (Indiana Acts, 1929, c. 164.1), which is applicable to national banks in so far as it is consistent with 
the policy or provisions, express or reasonably implied, under that code § 2, the relation between the forwarding 
bank and the collecting bank is that of principal and agent until the agent has completed the collection. Whether a 
fiduciary relation continues even afterward, upon the theory that the proceeds of the collection until remitted to the 
forwarder are subject to a trust, depends upon the circumstances. In the absence of tokens of a contrary intention, the 
better doctrine is, where the common law prevails, that the agency of the collecting bank is brought to an end by the 
collection of the paper, the bank from then on being in the position of a debtor, with liberty, like debtors generally, 
to use the proceeds as its own. “One who collects commercial paper through the agency of banks must be held 
impliedly to contract that the business may be done according to their well-known usages, so far as to permit the 
money collected to be mingled with funds of the collecting bank.” 
98 -  Cooper, 507 2d at 614. The court citied “4 A. Scott & William Franklin, The Law of Trusts (Little Brown & 
Company. eds., 4d ed. 1989) § 534” to establish that the bank, as a debtor, was entitled to use the proceeds as its 
own. This is the regular custom of banks and indeed it would seem that a bank could hardly function in any other 
way. 
99 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 534. 
100 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 540.  
101 - The California supreme court attempted to support its conclusion that the defendant did not part with the 
proceeds of the check by looking to an additional side of Article 3. From the distinctive use of the term “proceeds” 
in old § 3-419(3), as opposed to the term “for value” which establishes holder in due course status for a bank under 
old § 3-302, the court reasoned that old § 3-419(3) was not meant to protect the depositary bank merely because it 
may have given value to the forger. Cooper, 507 P.2d at 616. However, this argument is not convincing in a 
conversion context. The Holder in due course language, even by analogy, would seem wholly inapplicable where a 
forged indorsement was involved since the party “depositary bank” taking from the forger cannot be considered as a 
“holder.” See old § 1-201(21): Holder" means: (A) the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is 
payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession. Cooper, 507 P.2d at 616. 
102 - Old § 3-302. 
103 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 534. 
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consideration is “value.”104 Therefore, the court stated that the fact that the legislatures did not 
utilize the term “value.” Instead, the legislatures utilized a different terminology in old § 3-
419(3) indicates that the language of this provision was not intended to refer to the bank’s 
payment to the forger as such consideration. If the legislatures had intended to protect depositary 
banks that had just given “value” for a check, they would have used a precise language to 
indicate that.105 
The California supreme court structured its analysis on credible and effectual legal 
principles. Indeed, a ratification doctrine was the resolution of recovery by courts for a real 
payee against a depositary bank before the enactment of U.C.C., and nothing in old § 3-419(3) 
reveals that the legislatures rejected its rationale. Old Subsection 3-419(3) states that the 
depositary bank shall not be liable to a real owner “in conversion or otherwise.” This language 
recognizes the different theories of suits existed before the enactment of U.C.C. and expects the 
ratification suit to exist under the U.C.C., subject to the old § 3-419(3) defense; therefore, they 
utilized the term “otherwise.” Also, the court described the relationship between the real payee 
and a depositary bank after the collection of the check as a relation between a creditor and his 
debtor which appeared to be a sound legal position under U.C.C. Relying on old § 4-213(3) and 
its official comments, the court held that the U.C.C. supported the bank’s status as a debtor upon 
final settlement.106 It is specifically because old § 4-213(3)107 made a collecting bank, after 
receiving a final settlement for a check, accountable to its client for the amount of the check 
rather than for check’s proceeds.108 The conclusion that the U.C.C. anticipated is the 
continuation of a bank’s pre-U.C.C. liability as a debtor to the real owner of a check until the 
final settlement seemed justified. The official comment109 to old § 4-213 gave a further 
strengthen to the court’s conclusion. The official comment stated that after the settlement of the 
check, the given credit by the bank becomes final, and in the usual case the bank’s agency status 
terminates, and the bank becomes a debtor to its client for the amount of the proceeds.110 
                                                          
104 - Current § 1-204. Value. “Except as otherwise provided in Articles 3, 4, [and] 5, [and 6], a person gives value for 
rights if the person acquires them: (1) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the extension of 
immediately available credit, whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is provided for in the 
event of difficulties in collection; (2) as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction of, a preexisting claim; (3) by 
accepting delivery under a preexisting contract for purchase; or (4) in return for any consideration sufficient to 
support a simple contract.” 
105 - Cooper, 507 P.2d at 616.  
106 - Cooper, id at 615. 
107 - The determination of when an item is finally paid is governed by U.C.C. (1963) § 4-213. 
108 - After a collecting bank has received a final settlement for an item, it will be accountable to its customers for the 
amount of the item, and provisional credit given for the item in the customer's account will become final. U.C.C. § 
4-213 (3). 
109 - Old § 4-213, Comment 9. “Subsection (3) states the general rule that if a collecting bank receives settlement for 
an item which is or becomes final, the bank is accountable to its customer for the amount of the item. One means of 
accounting is to remit to its customer the amount it has received on the item. If previously it gave to its customer a 
provisional credit for the item in an account, its receipt of final settlement for the item "firms up" this provisional 
credit and makes it final. When this credit given by it so becomes final, in the usual case its agency status 
terminates, and it becomes a debtor to its customer for the amount of the item. See also, Section 4-201(1).” 
110 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 691. 
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However, the only issue that faces the California supreme court analysis is its dependence 
on the law of constructive trusts which seems significantly unpractical. The reason that drove the 
California supreme court to apply the law of constructive trust, which allows the plaintiff to trace 
his proceeds into the insolvent bank’s money is to give the plaintiff the right to rise above the 
insolvent bank’s general creditors. The court reliance on the constructive trust seems 
inappropriate since the defendant bank was not bankrupt and, the requirement of the useful trusts 
doctrine to hold the depositary bank liable as a constructive trustee is to find that the depositary 
bank has, in fact, noticed that the deposit is unlawful. Accordingly, if the depositary bank fails, 
the real owner of the deposited money is entitled to a priority above other creditors of the 
bank.111 However, it could have been appropriate for the court to rely on the tracing right from 
the equitable doctrines related to the conversion of personal property.112 The tracing principles 
that are applicable to the conversion of personal property are identical to those discussed by the 
court.  However, when a depositary bank does not act willfully, a court can only invoke an 
equitable lien for the true owner. The difference between the equitable lien and the constructive 
trust discussed by the court is simply that the constructive trust forces the wrongdoer to account 
for all profits derived by the wrongful act,113 while the equitable lien only enforced to the extent 
of the property’s value that the owner lost.114 
In the conversion of personal property, a depositary bank as a converter which in 
transformed a real payee's property into cash proceeds earned a legal title to the proceeds.115 
Consistent with this legal title, the depositary bank has an equitable duty to convey the new 
product “cash proceeds” only to the real owner,116 who can enforce his equitable rights against 
the depositary bank through the imposition of an equitable lien117. If the depositary bank mingles 
the new product “cash proceeds,” with his funds, the equitable lien grants the owner the right to 
trace his cash proceeds within those funds.118 Recovery is authorized so long as the depositary 
bank’s funds are equal to or more than the amount of the real payee’s claim.119 Thus, the 
California supreme court’s discussion of tracing rights might be accurate if it did build its 
argument on the equitable lien theory of relief.120 
Regardless of the legitimacy of tracing right under a constructive trust or equitable lien 
concepts when conversion takes place, an inherent inconsistency becomes obvious in the 
California court’s analysis. This inconsistency came from the doctrine of ratification which, as 
the court properly described, was substantial to the plaintiff's recovery from the bank under § 3-
419(3). Ratification afforded a presumption which established that the proceeds of the check 
arrived at the depositary bank, but at the same time, the wrongful collection of the check became 
                                                          
111 -  Scott, supra note 98, at § 528. 
112 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 692. 
113 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 462. 
114 - Tolley, supra note 25, at note 84.  
115 - 11 Caryl A. Yzenbaard, The Law of Trusts & Trustees (West. eds., 4d ed. 2009) at § 476. 
116 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 507 p 554. 
117 - “The person whose property is wrongfully used is entitled at his option to enforce either a constructive trust or 
an equitable lien.” Scott, supra note 98, at § 507; “the owner of property not only is entitled to enforce an equitable 
lien upon the product, but he may at his option charge the converter as constructive trustee of the product.” Scott, 
supra note 98, at § 509 p 585, 
118 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 515 p 605.  
119 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 509, § 515 p 610. 
120 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 692.  
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legitimate.121 When the California supreme court imposed the constructive trust law, it 
apparently overlooked this important effect of ratification. Therefore, the real payee has no 
longer the right to claim that the depositary bank committed conversion since the real payee had 
already ratified the collection of the check for its proceeds. The ratification action automatically 
omits the wrongdoing in the depositary bank action of possessing the proceeds,122 and the 
relation between the real payee and the depositary bank becomes a debt relation; therefore, the 
bank is entitled to use the proceeds as its own since it is the debtor of the real owner. 
Accordingly, the supreme court should have limited the real owner to the legal remedies of the 
creditor against his debtor which has never included a right on the part of the creditor to trace his 
proceeds.123 
Therefore, as long as ratification is a fundamental part of the real owner’s theory of 
recovery as the court stated, it would make the equitable tracing principles inapplicable. Since 
ratification implies that the depositary bank did not commit any wrongful act, while the law of 
constructive trust should be used to protect a creditor only in the case of wrongful act (such as 
fraud), and where the general creditors would improperly benefit without such action.124 
Thereby, is the satisfaction that the California court granted against the defendant bank in the 
absence of ratification an equitable ruling? The answer is explicit in the language of old § 3-
419(3) which demands an examination into the location of proceeds. The subsection says that a 
depositary bank can only be liable to the extent of any proceeds in its hands. Considering 
ratification as the only accurate method to establish the receipt of proceeds by the depositary 
bank when a conversion has occurred, the phrase of old § 3-419(3) authorizes ratification use to 
cover only the remained proceeds. Thus, rationally, utilizing the ratification theory by old § 3-
419(3) precludes the application of equitable tracing principles as the California supreme court 
stablished to hold the defendant bank liable.125 
The California supreme court decision certainly illustrates the absence of an exact 
definition of the phrase “proceeds remaining” in old § 3-419(3).126 The absence of the definition 
justified the court to utilize an unforeseen sort of legal analysis to fulfill the requirement of the 
subsection and to hold the defendant bank liable. It would be helpful if there were a statutory 
definition that could serve to clarify the meaning of the phrase “proceeds” in the subsection. 
However, although the absence of a definition of “proceeds,” there was a logical source from 
                                                          
121 - The California court recognized this effect of ratification: “This ratification transmutes the remittance of funds 
by the payor bank into an authorized act for which it may debit its customer's account.” Cooper, 507 P.2d at 614. 
122 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 525 p 679 “if the relation is one of debt, the banker may properly use it for his own 
purpose and is of course guilty of no crime in so doing.”  
123 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 692-93. 
124 - Scott, supra note 98, at § 525 p 680. 
125 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 693. 
126 - The only definition of “proceeds” in the U.C.C. is located at U.C.C. (1963) § 9-306(1): “'Proceeds' includes 
whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." In the 
context of determining the meaning of the U.C.C. § 3-419(3) defense, a definition designed for application to 
security interests is not very helpful.” Id at note 93. 
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which a definition could be concluded to get an accurate understanding of the phrase “proceeds.” 
The source came from rulings that were adopted by the old § 3-419(3) official comments.127 
Gruntal v. National Surety Co., deemed to be the substantial ruling of broker liability 
before the enactment of U.C.C. and considered to be the base of old § 3-419(3).128 The New 
York appeals court emphasized that the application of the defense should be limited to the event 
when the broker “in good faith” had already paid the price of the bonds over to the seller. The 
primary focus of the decision was that a broker is a mere conduit between the seller and the 
purchaser. Thus, a broker who is “in good faith” and “without any ground of suspicion” received 
and sold bearer bonds should not be held responsible and endure a monetary loss if the broker 
has no previous knowledge that the bonds are stolen bonds. Therefore, it would be rational to 
infer that the legislatures of old § 3-419(3) intended to give depositary banks protection equal to 
the broker’s protection when they expressly limited the bank’s liability to the proceeds that are 
remaining within the bank treasury. 
 Further observation comes from the usage of the word “proceeds” to expand the 
protection of old § 3-419(3) to include depositary banks. Virtually, the protection before the 
adoption of the U.C.C. for an owner of an instrument against a depositary bank was determined 
regardless of the location of the check’s proceeds. In this context, courts in applying NIL ruled a 
depositary bank to be liable to a real owner of an instrument in cashing or accepting an 
instrument over a forged indorsement regardless of whether the proceeds are remaining in the 
bank’s hand.129 The defense of bona fide or any other defense was not acceptable if the 
depositary bank had fully paid the forger and accounted the check’s amount to the forger’s 
account after the collection.130 It would seem logical to assume that the legislatures of old § 3-
419(3) had substantial knowledge of the courts’ interpretation of the NIL when they decided to 
use a comparable language in old § 3-419(3). Thereon, the recognition of the legislature’s use of 
the term “proceeds” must be in the logic that protects a depositary bank if it parted with the 
proceeds.131 
2. Evaluating the courts’ approaches and their influence on the latter amendment of old § 3-
419(3) 
                                                          
127 - Official Comment. 5. to old § 3-419(3) states in pertinent part: Subsection 3 is intended to adopt the rule of 
decisions which has held that a representative, such as a broker or depositary bank, who deals with a negotiable 
instrument for his principal in good faith is not liable to the true owner for conversion of the instrument or 
otherwise, except that he may be compelled to turn over to the true owner the instrument itself or any proceeds of 
the instrument remaining in his hands. 
128 - Gruntal v. National Surety Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930). Gruntal was cited in the official comment 
to old § 8-318 as the basis for the bona fide defense provided the broker who sells investment securities on behalf of 
his principal. the court determined that it would be unfair to hold a broker liable in conversion for accepting stolen 
bearer paper. The brokers did not participate in the initial fraud and could not have known that the bearer 
instruments were stolen. Gruntal is generally considered a leading case illustrating the justification for the 
exceptional pre-U.C.C. treatment afforded the seller of bearer bonds. See also, Frederick J. Jr. Murphy, supra note 8, 
at page 361. 
129 - Id.  
130 - Mackey-Woodard, Inc., 419 P.2d at 854.  
131 - Tolley, supra note 25, at p 694. 
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Although the improper plea of constructive trust doctrine and the illogical source of the 
linguistic meaning beyond the word “proceeds,” the Cooper and Ervin rulings should not have 
impacted the future status the defense in old § 3-419(3). Both decisions involve unsound 
statutory analysis. The courts inappropriately interpreted the subsection in a manner to maintain 
the status that existed before the enactment of U.C.C. in which a depositary bank was liable for 
conversion to a real payee, regardless of the manifest intent of old § 3-419(3) to protect 
depositary banks. Therefore, discussing the courts’ purpose to chose explication that did not 
coordinate with old § 3-419(3) is important to understand the later amendment of the subsection.  
In both decisions, an appealing justification has been offered to promote justice by 
precluding circuity of action.132 Traditionally, the real payee of a forged check has besides his 
right to sue the depositary bank, the right to litigate the drawer of the check on the underlying 
contractual obligation and also the right to litigate the drawee bank for recovery in conversion. 
Both actions enacted within the U.C.C. Article 3.133 Ultimately, the U.C.C. has adopted the pre-
U.C.C. policy which placed the loss for a forged indorsement on the party who dealt directly 
with the forger of the check.134 Thus, regardless of the defense in old § 3-419(3), eventually, the 
depositary bank will sustain the loss incurred since the ability to recover from the forger is 
typically hard to occur. Thereon, it is logical to allow the real payee to sue the depositary bank 
directly instead of suing the drawee bank and the drawee bank sues the depositary bank. 
Precluding circuity of actions is the appealing reason that leads the courts to ignore the defense 
provided by old § 3-419(3). This policy was recognized before the enactment of U.C.C. and 
imposed to ask a substantial question regarding the necessity of the former § 3-419(3) defense.135 
There is a single legitimate reason for requiring the real payee to pursue the traditional 
route of suit against the drawer or the drawee bank. The legal purpose is a possible detrimental 
consequence against the depositary bank. After the actual payee received his recovery from the 
depositary bank, the latter will be unable to pursue a recovery lawsuit if there is a negligent act 
on the side of the drawer.136 A real payee by passing the drawer and starting a direct suit against 
a depositary bank, may show intent of the real payee to get his money without placing the loss on 
the party with whom he has done business, a move which might affect the upcoming business 
opportunities negatively with the negligent drawer.137 Unfortunately, the U.C.C. has no clear 
                                                          
132 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 318-19, and Cooper, 507 P.2d 609 at 617. 
133 - Old § 3-603 “The real owner's right of action against the drawer of the check is maintained by the fact that the 
drawer's underlying obligation to pay is not discharged yet when the check is paid over a forged indorsement.” Also, 
“The payee's rights against the drawee bank are maintained at old § 3-419(1)(c) and (2).” 
134 - The loss on a forged indorsement is transferred back to the party who took from the forger via the transfer 
warranties of old § 3-417 and § 4-207. 
135 - National Union Bank., 148 Md. 449, 129 A. at 699. 
136 - The most common form of drawer's negligence former to the amendment of 3-420 is a mis-mailing of an order 
instrument to a party with the same name as the payee. In old § 3-406, Comment 7. If a check has been mis-mailed, 
the payee may have the rights necessary to sue in conversion against the depositary bank. Allen v. Mendelsohn, 207 
Ala. 527, 93 So.416 (1922); Hoffman v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 Ill. App. 290, 20 N.E.2d 121 (1939). In other cases, 
courts denied the rights, stating that without delivery the payee gets no title to the instrument. Jones v. Bank of 
America, 49 Cal. App.2d 115, 121 P.2d 94 (1942); People ex rel. Nelson v. Kaspar American State Bank, 364 Ill. 
121, 4 N.E.2d 14 (1936). This issue resolved under current 3-420. The real payee has no right to sue for conversion 
before delivery. (discuss later). 
137 - “The absence of such a provision seems to deny to the bank the ability to use the “vouching-in” procedure of § 
3-803. However, in a situation where the negligence of the drawer has caused the forgery, it would seem reasonable 
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method would allow the depositary bank to pursue an action to transform the loss to the drawer 
of the check if the latter is negligent. U.C.C. has an equitable policy in old 3-404, 3-405, and 3-
406 that indicates a depositary bank should endure the loss incident to the collection of an 
instrument over a forged indorsement only when both the payee and the drawer are free from any 
negligence that might have been the direct cause of the unauthorized signature.138 The defense of 
old § 3-419(3) implicitly indicated an inference which ensures that the real payee should demand 
recovery from the drawer. 
Therefore, the unfairness towards the depositary bank happens when the actual payee 
litigates the depositary bank directly regardless of the negligence that the drawer might bear. The 
direct action against the bank serves to illustrate the hazard implicated when a court ignores the 
defense to enforce an economic policy. The outcome reached in both Ervin or Cooper may have 
been just attention to the specific facts presented in each case. However, when a court starts a 
case related to a new statutory provision, it must apply the statute with proper respect to the 
policy behind the legislative function. A court will be deemed to disregard its commitment when 
it ignores the apparent meaning of a statute which apparently produced rules altered the pre-
U.C.C.  judicial doctrines. 
Also, the official comment to old § 3-419(3) is wholly inadequate to offer a satisfactory 
justification for the variation. However, when courts are examining the pre-U.C.C. judicial 
decisions on the liability of depositary banks, the language of old § 3-419(3) should have 
assumed a clarity that under old § 3-419(3) a depositary bank is protected from liability the same 
as the seller of bearer bonds was under the pre-U.C.C. judicial doctrines. 
Courts in Ervin and Cooper and other cases139 refused to accept the defense of acting in 
good faith and according to reasonable commercial standards if the bank cashed an instrument, 
deposited it in the forger’s account, or took it for collection.140 The reason led to the courts’ 
refusal is different from one court to another. In Ervin, the court found that a depositary bank 
was not acting as a representative when it cashed an instrument and forwarded for collection. 
While the court in Cooper concluded that when the depositary bank cashes an instrument before 
collection, the bank, in fact, pays by using its own money and therefore the proceeds received 
from the payor bank is a property of the real owner. The court adopted an interpretation of the 
statutory term “proceeds” which eliminated the availability of the defense. In both Sherriff-
Goslin and Knesz, the courts held that a depositary bank eventually will bear the loss under the 
breach of implied warranty old § 4-207(1) because the depositary bank is the person who 
                                                          
to grant the directly-sued depositary bank the same defense against the payee which the drawee bank could have 
asserted against the drawer, on the theory that the loss ultimately should be imposed upon the person whose 
negligence caused the forgery. A liberal construction of rules of impleader could allow the depositary bank to bring 
the drawer into any direct suit by the payee. Additionally, making the drawer a party would solve the evidentiary 
problem caused by the fact that the negligence of the drawer may be exclusively within the personal knowledge of 
the drawer and the payee.” Tolley, supra note 25, at p 107. 
138 - “Under the U.C.C. a payee whose negligence has caused the unauthorized signature is precluded from recovery 
against any bank under (old) § 3-404(1). If a payee settles with a negligent drawer, the drawer cannot get his account 
reinstated at his own bank. Where the negligent drawer is allowed a direct suit against a depositary bank, the bank is 
afforded the same defenses against the drawer which the drawee bank could have asserted against him.” 
International Indus., Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
139 - Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 477 A.2d 806 (N.J.1984); Clients’ Sec. Fund of the Bar v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 219 N.J. Super. 325, 530 A.2d 357 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
140 - Current section 3-420 Official Comment. 3. 
29 
 
communicates with the forger. Courts had interpreted § 3-419(3) in different ways only to decide 
that a depositary bank is liable for conversion in cashing an instrument, deposit it, or take it for 
collection. Regardless of the obvious language of subsection 3-419(3) and the official comments 
indicating that the subsection was intended to adopt the reasoning of pre-U.C.C., decisions which 
dealt with the liability for the conversion of brokers selling stolen negotiable instruments and 
wanted to give the same protection to depositary banks. Also, since in most instances a forger 
would have cashed the check or withdrew the proceeds of the check before the real owner starts 
the lawsuit, commentators felt that the § 3-419(3) defense would absolve a depositary bank from 
any liability to a real owner.141  
Admittedly, this interpretation of the old § 3-419(3) defense raises fundamental questions 
of public policy and justice. Under all these criticisms, the legislature found themselves in need 
to rewrite old 3-419 in a way corresponds with the courts’ intent and the policies. Therefore, the 
legislature in 1990 amended old 3-419 and replaced it with current 3-420.142 
The official comments to current 3-420 indicate that the amendment was a result of 
criticism from the courts to subsection (3) of former section 3-419. Courts saw no reason why a 
depositary bank should have the defense stated in the subsection. The official comment referred 
to Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co.143 in which the supreme court of New Jersey stated 
that the depositary bank is ultimately liable because of its warranty to the payor bank under “old” 
§ 4-208(a)(1) and it is usually the most convenient defendant in cases involving multiple checks 
drawn on various banks. The supreme court illustrated that the literal application of “old” § 3-
419(3), blocking a direct action against the depositary-collecting bank, would result in a chain of 
litigation. First, the owner of a check may bring an action against the drawer for the fulfillment 
of the underlying obligation under “old” 3-804 or sue the drawee bank for conversion under 
“old” § 3-419(1)(c). The drawer will sue the drawee or payor bank for wrongfully debiting his or 
her account for payment to the forger under “old” § 4-401. The drawee or payor bank will be 
required to sue its transferor. The suit will proceed successively up the collection stream based 
on strict warranties of presentment and transfer under the U.C.C. until the depositary bank, 
ultimately liable for honoring the forged instrument, is reached.144  
The recognition of single direct action by an owner against the depositary bank and the 
avoidance of circuitous or chain litigation overrides the plain terms of § 3-419(3). That policy 
was undoubtedly known to the legislatures of the U.C.C. It was presumably within their 
contemplation when § 3-419(3) was integrated granting immunity to these banks. The supreme 
court found itself constrained to adhere to the choice made by the legislatures. However, the 
legislatures did not give no comment regarding that this choice leads to intolerable or absurd 
results, a factor that would have given the supreme court pause in applying § 3-419(3) by its 
terms. 
The supreme court cited Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,145 to hold that the 
defendant bank still retained the proceeds of the alleged checks. Also, the supreme court cited 
                                                          
141 - 1 Ronald A. Anderson, Anderson’s Uniform Commercial Code 687 (The Lawyers C. ed,.2d ed. 1961); Henry J 
Bailey, The Law of Bank Checks § 15.14, at p 517 (The Banking Law Journal. ed,.3rd ed. 1962). 
142 - Current 3-420 Official Comment. 3. 
143 - 477 A.2d at 806. 
144 - 477 A.2d at 811-12.  
145 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 311. 
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Cooper v. Union Bank,146 to find that the defendant bank still held the entire “proceeds” of the 
forged checks, notwithstanding the fact that the forger’s account with the defendant bank in 
which the forged checks had been deposited was depleted. The reason that the bank always 
retains the proceeds of the forged checks in trust for the real owner, unless the bank’s assets 
dwindle below the amount of the checks.147 
The official comment drew from Knesz that there is no basis for requiring the owner of 
the check to bring multiple actions against the various payor banks and to require those banks to 
assert warranty rights against the depositary bank.  In revised article 3, the defense provided by § 
3-420(c) is limited to collecting banks other than the depositary bank. Therefore, if the owner of 
an instrument brought a suit against both the payor bank and the depositary bank, the owner, of 
course, is entitled to one recovery.148   
  
IV. The Liability under current Section 3-420 
The owner of an instrument that paid on a forged indorsement may wish to sue for 
conversion directly the individual who may be ultimately liable, which is, the person who dealt 
directly with the forger, which overwhelmingly, is depositary banks.149 In that event, a forger 
after tampering a payee’s indorsements will move to cash or deposit the checks in an account 
opened in one or several banks even when the checks drawn on numerous banks. Thence, a suit 
against a depositary bank is more efficient than multiple lawsuits against multiple payors.150   
Before the amendment of old § 3-419(3), the Pennsylvania supreme court151 found that a 
depositary bank was liable only to the extent of cash and other value it had recovered from the 
forger’s assets. Full liability found by another court where stolen checks restrictively indorsed by 
the forger and deposited to his accounts, but the failure of the bank to be insulated from liability 
attributed to the failure to comply with the restrictive indorsements. Thus, a direct conversion 
action under old § 3-419(3) against other than the payor bank intended to be limited to the 
situation where the forger had left all or a portion of the unlawful gains on deposit, which was a 
doubtful occurrence.152 As is discussed above, however, under essential cases, courts found a 
different interpretation to the definition of the words “representative” and “proceeds” to hold 
depositary or payee banks liable for conversion to the true owner153. Consequently, under current 
Article 3, the defense of acting according to reasonable commercial standards that a depositary 
bank could use is deleted because of the reasoning in the New Jersey superior court’s opinion.154 
                                                          
146 - Cooper, 507 P.2d at 613. 
147 - Cooper, 507 P.2d at 615. 
148 -  Current 3-420 Official Comment. 3. 
149 -  § 3-420(a). 
150 - Frederick J. Jr. Murphy, supra note 8, at p 367. 
151 - West Penn Admin., Inc. v. Union Nat’l Bank, 233 Pa. Super. 311, 335 A.2d 725 (1975). 
152 - Jackson Vitrified China Co. v. People’s Am. Nat’l Bank, 388 So.2d 1059 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Denn v. First 
State Bank, 316 N.W.2d 532 (Minn.1982); Coulter Electronics, Inc. v. Commercial Bank, 727 F.2d 1078, 38 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 239 (11th Cir.1984). 
153 - Ervin, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473.; Cooper, 9 Cal. 3d 371; Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 477 A.2d 806 
(N.J.1984). 
154 - 3-420 Official Comment. 3. 
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In the leading case under old Article 3, Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co.,155 the court 
concluded that there is no reason why a depositary bank should have the defense since it is 
ultimately liable because of its warranty to the payor bank. Subsection 4-208(a)(1).156 There is no 
ground for requiring an owner to bring multiple actions against several payor banks and to 
require those banks to assert warranty rights against the depositary bank. In revised Article 3, the 
defense provided by § 3-420(c) is limited to collecting banks other than depositary banks. Thus, 
a suit for conversion against a depositary bank is promoted and the owner, of course, is entitled 
to recovery.157  
Therefore, this Chapter focuses on the applicable law to sue for conversion, the elements 
that will lead to holding a depositary bank liable for conversion, and when the owner could sue 
the depositary bank for conversion. After that, the Chapter discusses whether the drawer of an 
instrument could sue for conversion and then focus on depositary bank defenses to prevail in a 
suit for conversion.  
1. Article 3 is the applicable Law 
After the amendment of 3-419,158 the subsection altered the treatment of depositary 
banks. A depositary bank who dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was 
not the real owner of the instrument could be suing for conversion. Currently, the real owner’s 
right to sue a depositary bank for conversion incorporated in § 3-420(c).159  
A significant notice before moving to talk about conversion under 3-420 is that once an 
instrument is indorsed and delivered to a depositary bank, Article 3 is the applicable law. The 
owner of the instrument cannot withdraw from Article 3 merely because s/he chooses not to 
bring its action as one for conversion or sue for breach of contract. For instance, after a plaintiff 
argued that since she decided to pursue her claims under theories outside the U.C.C., and 
precisely because she did not bring an action of conversion, she thought the U.C.C. is not 
applicable. The appeals court of Mississippi overruled saying that the general negligence claim is 
alive and well in our law by section 1-103. The defense is accurate up to the time where the 
forger indorsed the check and delivered it to the defendant bank, after that moment the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties determined and governed by the code.160 In a different case,161 the 
                                                          
155 - Montgomery, supra note 82, at p 225. 
156 - 3-420 Official Comment. 3. Subsection 3-419(3) drew criticism from the courts, that saw no reason why a 
depositary bank should have the defense stated in the subsection; Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 477 
A.2d 806 (N.J.1984). The depositary bank is ultimately liable in the case of a forged indorsement check because of 
its warranty to the drawee bank under § 4-208(a)(1) and it is usually the most convenient defendant in cases 
involving multiple checks drawn on different banks. 
157 - 3-420 Official Comment 3. 
158 - Current 3-420. 
159 - § 3-420(a); old § 3-419 Official Comments. 2: A negotiable instrument is the property of the holder; old § 3-419 
Official Comments. 3: “Any payment on a forged indorsement, even though made in good faith, is an exercise of 
dominion and control over the instrument inconsistent with the rights of the owner and results in liability for 
conversion”.  
160 - Hancock Bank v. Ensenat, 819 So.2d 3, 46 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 936 (Miss. App. 2001). 
161 - Southwest Bank v. Information Support Concepts, Inc., 149 S.W.3d 104, 55 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 116 (Tex. 
2004). 
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depositary bank attempted to escape liability for conversion by joining as an additional defendant 
“the employee who stole the checks.” The bank would then have been liable only for its 
proportional share of the loss under a Texas proportionate responsibility statute. The court 
refused to apply the proportionate liability statute because it would ignore the U.C.C. itself and 
thwart the Code’s specific statutory allocation of responsibility. 
A further case, an insurance company, forwarded checks for fire damages to an apartment 
building, were made jointly payable to the owner, the repair contractor and the mortgagee, 
requiring indorsement by all three payees. The repair contractor forged the indorsement of the 
mortgagee and obtained payment of the check. The mortgagee sued the drawer (the insurance 
company), but the trial court granted the drawer’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate 
court affirmed, limiting the plaintiff’s right to recover to action in conversion under 3-420, 
against the banks that cashed or paid the checks. A check lacking a required indorsement is not 
properly payable under 4-401, and the depositing or payment of that check is invalid under § 3-
420. Here, the plaintiff could not recover from the repair for a lost check under 3-309 because 
the location of the checks was known. Also, the plaintiff could not recover from the drawer on 
the underlying obligation because of the suspension by delivery of the check under § 3-310. 
Thus, a conversion claim against either the forger or depositary bank is the convenient 
remedy.162 
In different facts, when the check is payable to co-payees, the payee who is indorsement 
forged has the right to sue the drawer of the check. Also, if a check were made payable to both 
the insured and the mortgagee, the indorsement would not be correct unless both of them indorse 
it.163 When the check came to the hands of the insured, he cashed it without the mortgagee’s 
indorsement. The mortgagee sued the insurer, but the trial court held in favor of the insurer who 
argued that delivery of the draft to the insured discharges the obligation of the insurer to the 
mortgagee. The appeals court of Texas reversed, noting that the claim of the mortgagee 
discharged by payment of the draft to the insured; since the mortgagee did not indorse the draft, 
there was no discharge for the drawer under § 3-602.164 The court concluded that the plaintiff has 
the right to allege a cause of action to recover the amount of the check from the defendant drawer 
of the check under 3-309. Then, the drawer defendant may move to recover its loss from the 
subcontractor who apparently forged the indorsement on the check, or versus the bank which 
honored the forged check.165 
2. The Elements of a Suit for Conversion 
An action for conversion will not be accepted unless several elements have accrued. The suit for 
conversion will not be allowed unless the depositary bank has actually made a payment on the 
forged instrument to the forger. Then, the discussion will be on the availability of the defense of 
                                                          
162 - Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 122387, 371 Ill. Dec. 824, 990 
N.E.2d 1202, 80 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 920 (App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013), appeal denied, 374 Ill. Dec. 569, 996 N.E.2d 16 
(Ill. 2013). 
163 - ViewPoint Bank v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 626, 84 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 295 (Tex. App. 
Dallas 2014). 
164 - The court citied McAllen Hospitals, L.P. v. State Farm County Mutual Insurance Co., 433 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. 
2014). Id at 634.  
165 - ViewPoint Bank ,439 S.W.3d at 635. See also Crystaplex Plastics v. Redevelopment Agency, 77 Cal. App. 4th 
990, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (2000). 
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good faith and follow reasonable commercial standards and whether a depositary bank could 
allege that against a claim for conversion. Also, the actual payee must receive the instrument 
from the drawer or the indorser otherwise the suit will not be qualified. After that, the discussion 
will be on the statute of limitation and the amount of recovery to which the owner is entitled. 
a. The Bank cashed the Instrument  
The owner of an instrument bearing an unauthorized or forged indorsement cannot sue in 
conversion unless and until the depositary bank has made a payment to the forger. Therefore, if 
the bank did not cash or deposit the instrument into the forger’s account, the claim for 
conversion would be dismissed.166 There would be no cause of action for conversion unless an 
actual payment made for the instrument bearing forged indorsement. Thus, if a depositary bank 
gave provisional credit to a co-payee on the face amount of a check after the co-payee forged the 
indorsement of the plaintiffs, subsection 3-420(a) is not applicable because the depositary bank 
took a check for collection only.167 
Moreover, the depositary bank must make a cash payment to be suing for conversion. 
The bank is not liable for conversion just because it deposits a check to the depositor's account or 
stamps the check paid. Also, the bank is not liable if deposited the amount of the check in the 
forger’s account, but at the same time placed a “hold” upon the amounts deposited, and did not 
allow the forger to withdraw them until the receipt of the proceeds from the payor. Section 3-420 
applies only when a bank paid a check on a forged indorsement and thus does not apply to the 
case in which the bank took a check for collection or did not pay its amount to the forger.168 
Furthermore, a depositary bank would not be liable under § 3-420(c) for accepting a 
check with an improper indorsement, unless the drawee bank pays and transfer the proceeds of 
the check to the depositary bank. The depositary bank was not liable under 3-420 because the 
drawee bank subsequently dishonored the check and therefore no converted proceeds were 
forwarded to the depositary bank.169 
b. Bank’s Failure to Follow Reasonable Commercial Standards 
 A representative was liable under old Article 3 without regard to any proceeds remaining 
if it did not act in good faith or follow reasonable commercial standards.170 Currently, the 
defense deleted from § 3-420(c). However, several cases have presented this situation. For 
example, where stolen checks restrictively indorsed by the forger and deposited to his account at 
the defendant bank, the court held not only that the bank had failed to comply by the restrictive 
indorsements but also that the defendant bank’s conduct violated the standards of care for 
depositary banks.171  
                                                          
166 - Franklin v. Safeco Ins. Co., 303 Or. 376, 737 P.2d 1231 (1987). 
167 - 3-420 Official Comment. 1.  
168 - Franklin v. Safeco Ins. Co., 303 Or. at 387-88.  
169 - G.M.A.C. v. Citizens Commercial & Savings Bank, 46 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
170 - This requirement is deleted under § 3-420(c), which also denies the defense to depositary, as opposed to 
collecting, banks. Bad faith also will remove the defense. 
171 - Underpinning & Foundation Constr., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 N.Y.2d 459, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 386 
N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979). See also Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Boatmen’s National Bank of St. Louis, 13 F.3d 
1254, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 841 (8th Cir.1994). 
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Also,172 when the deviation consisted of an indorsement that was entirely missing, the 
court concluded that the test is comparing the defendant bank’s practices with the familiar 
reasonable commercial standards in the locale or industry not the commercial standards of the 
specific representative. The deposition of Marine’s Assistant Cashier presented to the district 
court admitted that the defendant bank had failed to comply with its own commercial standards 
in dealing with the instrument without obtaining the indorsement of plaintiff “Central.” No 
material issue of fact presented regarding this issue.  
However, courts in other cases presenting less damaging facts, probably induced by the 
perceived efficiency of the direct action,173 worked hard to find a failure to follow reasonable 
standards to reject the depositary bank’s defense in a suit for conversion. For instance, when the 
defendant bank allowed the deposit of checks payable for taxes into an account controlled by the 
plaintiff’s accountant while the accountant was not entitled to the proceeds of those checks 
because the plaintiff did not indorse the checks to the accountant, the trial court permitted the 
defendant bank’s defense of commercial reasonableness under section 3-406. The trial court 
found that the plaintiff’ negligence in dealing with his accountant substantially contributed to the 
scheme and that the defendant bank followed “reasonable commercial standards” in paying the 
checks. Also, the trial court found that the policy of the bank in dealing with checks is identical 
to that of similar local banks. Following similar procedures of local banks would not expose the 
bank to liability. However, the appeals court held that the defendant bank failed to inquire 
whether the checks have the proper indorsement before depositing them in the accountant’s 
account and the bank’s failure constitutes an engagement in unreasonable commercial 
practices.174 
 As noted above, this defense was deleted from current § 3-420(c), allowing a direct 
action against depositary banks regardless whether they acted in good faith or according to 
reasonable commercial standards. However, suing a representative other than depositary banks 
restricts the representative’s liability to the proceeds remaining, so long as the representative 
dealt with the instrument or its proceeds in good faith and followed customary commercial 
standards.  
c. The Real Payee received the Instrument175 
To sue a depositary bank for conversion under section 3-420, the actual payee must 
receive the instrument from the drawer; then the named payee only became the owner of the 
instrument. Also, if the drawer issued the instrument the bearer, the holder deemed to be the 
owner of the instrument. Moreover, if a co-owner of a company issued an instrument as the 
                                                          
172 - Handel v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 762 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1975). 
173 - A suit by the payee directly against the person who dealt with the forger is obviously more efficient than a suit 
by the payee against the payor, who then must sue in warranty, as others also may have to do, to place the loss 
ultimately upon the same person. 
174 - Govoni & Sons Const. Co., Inc. v. Mechanics Bank, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 742 N.E.2d 1094, 43 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 2d 1058 (2001).  
175 - 2 Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections, And Credit Cards § 12.03[2] 
(LexisNexis A.S. Pratt. eds., 3rd ed. 2017).  
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company’s representative and indoresed the instrument to himself, the other co-owners of the 
company are not entitled to conversion action under section 3-240.  
  Lopes the plaintiff owned stocks in the defendant Chase Bank. Mellon acted as Chase’s 
agent for stock transfer services. In June 2004, an unknown imposter, pretending to be Lopes or 
someone acting on his behalf, instructed Mellon to sell plaintiff’s shares and send the proceeds to 
an address in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the city in which Lopes lives. Someone who was not Lopez 
received the check and deposited in a Wachovia account that did not belong to Lopes. Wachovia 
negotiated the check; the real Lopez had no relationship with any account at Wachovia and did 
not receive the check or payment for his Chase stocks. 
The court stated that the comment to the 1990 revision of the U.C.C. makes clear, 
delivery to a third party who is not a co-payee or agent of the payee does not give the payee 
standing to sue for conversion.176 
Similarly, when the instrument indorsed in blank, the new holder is an owner of the 
instrument, and the intended owner is not entitled to sue the depositary bank for conversion 
because he does not hold the instrument. Georgia appeals court  177 discussed this matter saying 
that if a check indorsed in blank under section 3-205, the check is payable to bearer. When an 
instrument in a bearer form, any person is an owner of an instrument so long as that person 
possesses the instrument and thus under 3-301, the holder of an instrument is entitled to enforce 
it. The appeals court stated that an employee who stole cashier’s checks indorsed in blank by 
their payees and deposited them in his bank account was a holder entitled to enforce the checks. 
Therefore, the defendant bank is not liable for conversion under § 3-420(a) because the 
indorsement in blank made the faithless employee a legitimate holder and entitled him to impose 
the instrument. 
Moreover, there is no liability toward a depositary bank when the instrument bears an 
authorized indorsement by a person who is legitimately the owner of the instrument. The 
superior court of New Jersey178 held in a case its facts say that the plaintiff (an attorney) and one 
of the defendants were co-owners of a limited liability company. The defendant co-owner 
provided a check-cashing company with documents indicating his ownership share of the 
company and authority to cash checks, and then cashed checks payable to the limited liability 
company under his indorsement and embezzled the funds. The plaintiff sued the faithless co-
owner and the banks that paid the checks. The superior court concluded that Agency law, the 
rules on apparent authority, the U.C.C give the defendant as a co-owner the authority to indorse 
the checks.179 When an authorized agent for a company signs his name as an indorsement, it is as 
if he signed as the company. Even if the faithless co-owner here did not have actual authority to 
cash checks, he had apparent authority to do so.180  Therefore, no action for conversion against 
the depositary bank maintained because the depositary bank adequately relied on the check-
                                                          
176 - Lopes v. Mellon Inv’r Servs. LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88910 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007). 
177 - Gerber & Gerber, P.C. v. Regions Bank, 266 Ga. App. 8, 266 Ga. App. 8, 11(2), n. 1, 596 S.E.2d 174 (2004). 
178 - Kuhn v. Tumminelli, 366 N.J. Super. 431, 841 A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
179 - § 1-103(b): “Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause 
supplement its provisions.” 
180 - Sections 3-401, 3-404. 
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cashing company’s warranty that the co-owner was entitled to enforce the check and the 
indorsement was valid. Finally, the drawee banks relied on the depositary bank’s warranty that 
entitled to compel the check and were also immune to action for conversion under 3-420.  
After the delivery of the check,181 the payee as an owner could sue only the depositary 
bank, not the drawer. For instance, when a drawer (an insurance company) proceeds checks for 
fire damage to an apartment building were made jointly payable to the owner, the repair 
contractor, and the mortgagee, requiring indorsement by all three payees. The contractor forged 
the indorsement of the mortgagee and obtained payment of the checks. The mortgagee sued the 
drawer, but the trial court granted the drawer’s motion for summary judgment. The court of 
appeals affirmed, limiting the mortgagee’s remedy to an action for conversion under 3-420, 
against the depositary bank that cashed or paid the checks. A check lacking a required 
indorsement is not properly payable under 4-401. Consequently, deposit or payment of that 
check is conversion under 3-420 (subject to a limited exception at 4-205, the mortgagee could 
not recover from the drawer for a lost check under 3-309182 because the location of the checks 
was known. Also, the mortgagee could not recover from the drawer on the underlying obligation 
because the delivery of the check suspended them under 3-310.183 
Further, cases in which an instrument is payable to two persons and the two persons are 
not alternative payees, such as a check payable to A and B. Under § 3-110(d) the check can be 
negotiated or enforced only by both payees co-operating. Consequently, neither payee acting 
without the consent of the other is a person entitled to enforce the check. If A indorses, the check 
and B does not, A’s indorsement is not sufficient to allow negotiation of the check. So, if a 
depositary bank cashes or accepts the check for deposit to A’s account, a depositary bank is 
liable to B for conversion of the check if B did not give his consent to the transaction. A, acting 
alone, is not the individual entitled to enforce the check because A is not the holder of the 
check.184 The depositary bank does not get any greater rights under § 4-205(1). If the depositary 
bank acted for the interest of A, that does not entitle the depositary bank to become the holder of 
the check under § 4-205(1) because A, its client, was not a legitimate holder who could enforce 
his right on the instrument.185 
d. Statute of Limitation 
The three-year limitation period at § 3-118 begins at the time of the conversion, when the 
cause of action accrues, not its later discovery unless the defendant engaged in fraudulent 
concealment.186 As an example, after an insurance claims draft issued to two payees, it was 
negotiated to the defendant bank by one of the co-payee without the required indorsement of the 
other. Thirteen months later, the other payee (whose indorsement was missing) sued the 
defendant bank for conversion. The court stated that the one-year limitation period for 
                                                          
181 - § 3-310(b). 
182 - One of the requirement under § 3-309(a)(3) The person cannot reasonably obtain possession of the instrument 
because the instrument was destroyed, its whereabouts cannot be determined, or it is in the wrongful possession of 
an unknown person or a person that cannon be found or is not amenable to service of process. 
183 - Parkway Bank and Trust Co. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 122387, 371 Ill. Dec. 824, 
990 N.E.2d 1202, 80 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 920 (App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013).  
184 - § 3-110(d) and 3-110. Official Comment. 4. 
185 - 3-420. Official Comment. 1. 
186 - Peoples Bank of Biloxi v. McAdams, 171 So.3d 505 (Miss. 2015).   
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conversion actions in Louisiana barred the claim. The court also adopted the majority position, 
limiting the discovery rule to exceptional circumstances such as where there has been fraudulent 
concealment. The court noted that this puts the burden of discovery on the party best able to 
discover the fraud.187 The plaintiff asserting an action for conversion has the responsibility to 
find and prove the fraud.188 
 In a different case,189 the court dismissed the client’s claim against the depositary bank 
based on the three-year statute of limitations on actions for conversion of negotiable instruments 
contained in § 3-118(g). The undisputed facts indicated that the client was not aware of her claim 
of conversion until her new attorney discovered the conversion in March 2010, after the 
expiration of the statute of limitations on her allegation. Also, no facts are indicating that the 
plaintiff should have known about her conversion claim before the start day of the statute of 
limitations. The court ruled that the statute of limitations prevent the conversion’s action. The 
claim for conversion was subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in subsection 3-
118(g), and the plaintiff had not alleged any fraudulent concealment on the part of the bank. 
Also, if a plaintiff has an allegation on several checks, each check created a separate 
cause of action for conversion under section 3-420. After a medical office employee stole 269 
insurance checks payable to her employer, she forged the employer’s indorsement and deposited 
the checks in her account at the credit union. The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court ruling 
that all 269 checks constituted a single or continuous injury for purposes of the statute of 
limitations. Each check created a separate cause of action for conversion under 3-420.190 Thus, if 
action on one of two of the checks barred by the statute of limitation, the plaintiff is still able to 
go forward in his action on the other checks.  
 
e. Amount of Liability under Subsection 3-420(b)191 
Subsection 3-420(b) creates an assumption that the measure of accountability for which the 
depositary bank is liable is the whole amount of an instrument unless and until proof introduced 
which would back a finding of the converse. Subsection 3-420(b) allowed depositary banks to 
provide evidence which may prove that the obligation is worth less because of an existence of a 
defense, or some other reasons. However, in the absence of evidence, subsection 3-420(b) 
explicitly limits the real owner’s recovery to the presented interest on the instrument. 
                                                          
187 - Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC v. January, 119 So. 3d 582, 80 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1225 (La. 2013). 
188 - UCC § 3-118(g): Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for 
conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion, (ii) for breach of 
warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this Article and not governed by this section 
must be commenced within three years after the [cause of action] accrues.  
189 - Hawkins v. Nalick, 363 Ill. Dec. 767, 975 N.E.2d 793, 78 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 593 (App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2012). 
190 - Rodrigues v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434, 57 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 392 (7th Cir. 2005).  
191 - § 3-420(b) In an action under subsection (a), the measure of liability is presumed to be the amount payable on 
the instrument, but recovery may not exceed the amount of the plaintiff's interest in the instrument. 
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The measure of accountability for conversion is typically the face amount of an 
instrument.192 However, subsection 3-420(b) added a clause by which the real payee’s recovery 
may not exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s interest in an instrument. In the case an instrument 
is payable to multiple payees, the interest of one of the payees may be less than the amount of an 
instrument. Therefore, in a matter of various payees, subsection 3-110(b) states that the payment 
of an instrument is void unless all payees join in the action of cashing the instrument. Thus, if 
one of the payees has a limited interest in an instrument, the last clause in § 3-420(b) prevents 
him or her from receiving unworthy payment.193 For instance, a New York Law Firm forged the 
signature of an Estate’s administrator on a settlement check payable to the Law Firm and the 
Estate jointly.194 The Law Firm cashed the check and deposited the funds in the Law Firm’s 
account at the defendant bank, then filed bankruptcy. The Estate filed a claim with the client 
protection fund and received indemnity in the amount of two-thirds of the value of the settlement 
check, which was equal to the amount of the check minus the contingency fee the Law Firm 
would have received. As part of the compensation agreement, the Estate assigned its rights to the 
fund, which then sued the defendant bank for conversion. The question was whether the plaintiff 
could recover the entire amount of the settlement check from the bank or only the net after 
deduction of the legal fee. The court stated that the plain language of old § 3-419(2)195 provides 
that the remedy for conversion is the face amount of the instrument. The Estate never received 
any of the funds, and its assignee could not be in any worse position than the assignor. Therefore, 
the critical inquiry for the court to find was whether the plaintiff indeed received a possible 
benefit from the forger, to be able to justify the forger’s claim to the contingency fee.196 
The depositary bank could deduct from the remedy to the owner any amount that the 
owner of an instrument received from the forger. The appeals court of Georgia disagreed with 
the defendant bank that paid a negotiable instrument over a forged indorsement when the bank 
claims that check issued by the drawer upon a fraudulent application and not based upon any 
obligation. The court said that the check is a negotiable instrument which names Thornton as a 
payee and the plaintiff is a legitimate holder.197 However, the court did limit the liability of the 
defendant bank to the amount not returned to the drawer by the forger.198 The court said it is the 
party whose name forged that usually suffers the loss, and if the defendant bank’s argument were 
adopted no one whose name forged on an instrument could seek recovery for conversion. 
However, the court noted that the measure of the defendant bank’s liability for the conversion is 
assumed to be the face amount of the instrument under § 3-419(2). Thus, the defendant bank is 
liable for the whole amount of the check unless evidence raised which would support a finding of 
otherwise. While Thornton’s suit is for the full-face amount of the instrument, the evidence 
                                                          
192 - § 3-420(b) The measure of liability is presumed to be the amount payable on the instrument, but 
recovery may not exceed the amount of the plaintiff's interest in the instrument. Also, under § 3-419(2), 
the measure of liability in action against a drawee was stated to be the face amount of the instrument. See 
also, 2 James J. White et al., Uniform Commercial Code § 19:9 (Thomson Reuters. eds.,6th ed. 2013). 
193 - § 3-420 Official Comment. 2.  
194 - Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 94 N.Y.2d 398, 706 N.Y.S.2d 66, 727 N.E.2d 
563 (2000). 
195 - Current § 3-420(b). 
196 - Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection, 94 N.Y.2d at 406. 
197 - Thornton & Co. v. Gwinnett Bank & Tr. Co.,151 Ga. App. 641, 260 S.E.2d 765 (1979). 
198 - Thornton & Co., 151 Ga. App. at 646. 
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shows that the forger has in fact repaid the drawer a serious part of the proceeds the forger 
received from cashing the converted check and Thornton has repaid the balance by the drawer. 
Since the only loss sustained by Thornton comes from its having to repay the drawer the amount 
represented by the fraudulent premium financing applications, which has no right to retain the 
proceeds of the check itself, any amount that the forger has refunded reduces Thornton’s loss and 
thus the defendant bank's liability. Therefore, Thornton's is entitled to recover, at most, the 
amount it has refunded to the drawer and the defendant bank is entitled to a set-off for any 
amounts the forger has repaid to the drawer.199 
  The rationale behind allowing depositary banks the right to reduce the interest of the 
plaintiff’s interest in the instrument stated by the appeals court of Washington.200 The court said 
that the doctrine of election of remedies, designed to prevent double recovery for a single loss, 
provides that if two or more inconsistent remedies exist, a party choosing one will be bound to 
the one remedy and precluded from asserting the others. Also, the court added that losses should 
not be placed upon negligent banks only because it is a convenient solution to do so or when 
such action will grant an unwarranted and unearned benefit upon another. The situation must 
consider in the light of general principles of law and equity which supplement the provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. In Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot,201 the court stated that the 
reason for allowing such setoff is that defendant bank cannot be said to have engaged in 
conversion “an unauthorized exercise of the rights of ownership” where the plaintiff has control 
of the funds.202 Besides allowing the defendant bank to set-off prevents unjust enrichment.203 
3. Drawer’s status under Section 3-420 
The drawer after the delivery of the instrument sustains two conditions. First, the 
underlying debt suspended, so the payee cannot sue on the underlying debt when the location of 
the instrument is known. Second, the drawer is not entitled to sue a depositary bank conversion 
under 3-420 because s/he after delivery is no longer the owner of the instrument. 
The payee cannot sue on the underlying debt when the location of the instrument is 
known. For instance, after the payee of stolen check sued the defendant for negligence because 
of damages suffered in a car accident, the defendant denied negligence and claimed that the 
defendant’s insurer had already paid the payee. The facts show that the defendant’s insurance 
carrier had mailed a check to the plaintiff’s post office box. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff 
payee received delivery within the meaning of 3-420 when the check delivered to the post office 
box. Someone else had taken the check from the post office box, forged the indorsement, and 
transferred it to a bank. While the plaintiff had a cause of action for conversion against the 
depositary bank and the person who stole the check, the plaintiff had no cause of action against 
the defendant because the defendant’s underlying obligation still suspended and the defendant’s 
insurer had already satisfied the claim by issuing and delivering the check to the plaintiff.204 
                                                          
199 - Id. 
200 - Bank of the W. v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 548 P.2d 563 (1976); S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp. 
v. Bozinovski, 148 Cal. App. 3d 503, 196 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1983). 
201 - Lawyers' Fund for Client Prot., 94 N.Y.2d at 406. 
202 - Mouradian v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan, 91 N.Y.2d 124, 667 N.Y.S.2d 340, 689 N.E.2d 1385 (1997). 
203 - Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A., 41 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858, 363 N.E.2d 564 (1977).  
204 - Bumgarner v. Wood, 149 N.C.App. 974, 563 S.E.2d 309, 47 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1099 (2002). 
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Also, the payee as a bearer or named on an instrument cannot sue a depositary bank for 
conversion unless s/he received the instrument before the conversion; until receipt, the payee has 
no property interest in the instrument.205 Thus, Western District Court of Tennessee denied the 
action for conversion because the plaintiff cannot sue for conversion for checks he had never 
received.206 The remedy in these circumstances is to sue on the underlying obligation under 3-
310207 as the underlying debt remains until the instrument received by the payee.208  
Also, the California appeals court of stated that § 3-420(a) does not give the drawer of the 
check after delivery to the payee any right to sue a depositary bank in conversion because the 
check went to the ownership of a different person. In Barrett Business Services, Inc., 209 the 
payee sued the drawer after the drawer mailed the check to a wrong address and someone 
negotiated and cashed the check with a forged indorsement. The California appeals court held 
that the drawer was liable to the payee for the amount of the check because the underlying 
obligation had not been suspended or paid, under sections 3-310, 3-601, and 3-602. The 
California appeals court noted that the drawer of the check has no conversion remedy against a 
depositary bank, except the remedy the drawer would have against the drawee bank for charging 
his account under section 4-401. Then, the drawee bank could assert a claim for breach of 
warranty under subsection 3-417(a)(1) or subsection 4-208(a)(1) against the depositary bank., 
The loss eventually will fall on the person who gave value to the thief for the check.210 
Moreover, a drawer of an instrument is not able to sue a depositary bank for conversion 
because of the delivery of the instrument to the payee. For instance, after an authorized employee 
issued a check on the company’s account and indorsed the check to himself and deposited it into 
his personal account in the defendant bank, the company sued the defendant bank for conversion. 
The court rejected the company’s claim, as the company was the drawer and once the check 
issued and delivered, the drawer was not the owner and could not sue for conversion. At that 
point, a check remains a debt of the drawer, not his or her property.211 
 Also, the indorser has no right to sue for conversion after the indorsement and delivery. 
Section 3-405 would preclude the transferee of an instrument from asserting a forged 
indorsement against a depositary bank if the forger of the check was an employee of the drawer 
with responsibility.212 Therefore, the court allowed the defendant bank “Citibank” to assert the 
defense of section 3-406 against an action for conversion. The court accepted the defense 
                                                          
205 - 3-420 Official Comment. 1: “under the last sentence of § 3-420(a), the payee has no conversion action because 
the check was never delivered to the payee. Until delivery, the payee does not have any interest in the check.” 
206 - Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exchange Facilitator Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 780 (W.D. Tenn. 2012). 
207 - § 3-310(b) “if a note or an uncertified check is taken for an obligation, the obligation is suspended to the same 
extent the obligation would be discharged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the instrument were taken.” 
208 - Barrett Business Services, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 204 Cal. App. 4th 597, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 
77 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 194 (2d Dist. 2012). 
209 - Barrett Business Services, Inc., 204 Cal. App at 602. 
210 - Barrett Business Services, Inc., 204 Cal. App at 603.  
211 - 300 Broadway Healthcare Center, L.L.C. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 425 N.J. Super. 33, 39 A.3d 248, 77 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 2d 248 (App. Div. 2012); Buchanan v. Helfrich, Civil No. 88-439-FR, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 523 (D. 
Or. Jan. 13, 1989). 
212 - Lee Newman, M.D., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 87 Cal. App. 4th 73, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 310, 43 UCC Rep. Serv. 
2d 912 (2d Dist. 2001). 
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because the employee of the plaintiff stole checks payable to the company, added a fictitious 
payee, indorsed in the name of the fictitious payee, and deposited the checks to his account at the 
defendant bank “Citibank.”213 
 However, there is no conversion if a check payable to two spouses was deposited into a 
joint account of the payees when an estranged spouse deposited a check payable to the other 
spouse into their joint account without the indorsement of the other spouse and cashed the check. 
The Louisiana appeals court found the payor bank’s arguments persuasive. The payor bank 
argued that FNBC was a party entitled to enforce the check and that its payment of the cashier’s 
check to FNBC discharged its liability. The payer bank pointed out as the trial court held that the 
base of FNBC’s right to impose the check is on the language of Mr. Marshall’s depositor’s 
agreement with FNBC. The depositor’s agreement appointed FNBC as Mr. Marshall’s 
mandatory such that it could supply his missing indorsement on any check deposited into his 
joint checking account provided the item be payable to either of the two joint account holders. 
Thus, it was legally bound to pay FNBC. Furthermore, the payor bank argued that if it had not 
paid FNBC, then FNBC could have brought an action against it as a holder in due course of the 
item protected under section 4-205,214and the drawee bank would have been entitled to seek 
indemnity from Mr. Marshall under the terms of the Indemnity Agreement.215 
 
4. Depositary Bank’s Defenses 
The depositary bank who cashed or accepted for deposit an instrument over an unauthorized or 
forged indorsement may avoid the liability for conversion in two events. The first is where, 
notwithstanding the unauthorized signature, the proceeds of the instrument goes to the hands of 
the intended party. The second event is where a forger’s indorsement may be legally irrelevant 
contains instances involving an imposter, a fictitious payee, and a padded payroll, and the case 
where a responsible employee forges the employer’s indorsement. However, the depositary bank 
may lose the defense if it acted in bad faith or failed to exercise reasonable commercial care.  
a. The Proceeds of Instrument went to the Intended Party 
Subsection 3-404(b) covers cases in which an instrument is payable to a fictitious or non-
existing person and to cases in which a payee is a real person, but the drawer or the maker does 
not intend the payee to have any interest in the instrument. Also, subsection 3-404(b) applies to 
any instrument, but its essential value is concerning checks drawing by corporations, other 
organizations, and all other forged check cases.216 
                                                          
213 - National Accident Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Citibank, FSB, 333 F. Supp. 2d 720, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  
214 - Section 4-205. “If a customer delivers an item to a depositary bank for collection: 
(1) the depositary bank becomes a holder of the item at the time it receives the item for collection if the customer at 
the time of delivery was a holder of the item, whether the customer indorses the item, and, if the bank satisfies the 
other requirements of Section 3-302, it is a holder in due course; and 
(2) the depositary bank warrants to collecting banks, the payor bank or other payor, and the drawer that the amount 
of the item was paid to the customer or deposited to the customer's account.” 
215 - Marshall v. First Bank & Trust, 848 So. 2d 660(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2003). 
216 - Section 3-404. Official Comment. 2.  
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However, the defense of subsection 3-404(b) does not apply where a faithless employee 
stole check payable to an intended payee and, indorsed it in the name of the payee. Subsection 3-
404(b) applies only on cases the authorized employee was the person who issues the instrument. 
For instance,217 a faithless employee intercepted specific insurance premium checks that one of 
the plaintiff’s client’s had made payable to the plaintiff. The faithless employee was not involved 
in any scene of plaintiff’s business that gave him authority to indorse or negotiate the checks. 
The faithless employee took the checks and altered them by adding a “slash” and extra payees, 
such as “Sherman” and “Sherman Imports, Inc.” The alterations were made either in a different 
typewritten font or different handwriting than that used on the original checks. The faithless 
employee maintained a checking account (Sherman Account) in the name of the altered payees 
with the defendant bank. He indorsed and deposited the checks in the Sherman account; the 
defendant bank accepted the checks and credited the account. The defendant bank then presented 
the checks for payment to various drawee banks. The plaintiff sued the defendant bank for 
conversion. The defendant bank contended that fictitious payee rules in subsection 3-404(b) 
apply to this case. However, Northern District Court of Illinois disagreed with the defendant 
bank the statutory fictitious payee rule covers situations where a bank honors a check bearing the 
forged indorsement of a fictional payee. However, subsection 3-404(b) covers issues where an 
employee with signing authority signs a check intending that the named payee receive it but later 
changes his mind and steals the check, indorsing it in the name of the payee. There is nothing in 
the rule, its history, or cases analyzing it, to suggest the rule applies to situations--such as the one 
here--between payees and drawee banks. All the example cited in the comments to the U.C.C. 
involve fraud or forgery occurring in the drawing or issuance of checks; courts have even held 
that if the intent to commit forgery arises after the check issuance, subsection 3-404(b) is not 
applicable.218 
The same verdict accrued when a cattle trading company signed checks by the company’s 
owner with the payee and amount lines left blank. The checks delivered to an employee, with 
instructions to fill in the amounts and payee names as needed to purchase cattle. Instead, the 
employee used the checks to embezzle from the employer. The faithless employee deposited 17 
unauthorized checks at the depositary bank; some had forged indorsements; others had no 
indorsements, and some indorsed in a name other than the payee. The cattle company sued the 
depositary bank for negligence and conversion. Southern District Court of West Virginia, 
rejecting the discovery rule, held that some of the claims barred by the statute of limitations 
under section 3-118. Also, the other claims failed as well because a drawer cannot sue for 
conversion under section 3-420 once the checks have been delivered to a new owner and on the 
grounds of the intended payee rule.219 
The drawer of an instrument cannot recover from the depositary bank for conversion in 
the event the named payee on the instrument is not the intended to have any interest.220 For 
                                                          
217 - Nat'l Accident Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Citibank, F.S.B., 243 F. Supp. 2d 763, 764. (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
218 - Nat'l Accident Ins. Underwriters Inc., F.S.B., 243 F. Supp. 2d. at 766. 
219 - Willier, Inc. v. Hurt, 64 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 759 (S.D. W. Va. 2007).  
220 - § 3-404(b) Official Comment. 2. Case #2. Same facts as Case #1 except that Supplier Co. is an actual company 
that does business with Corporation. If Treasurer intended to steal the check when the check was drawn, the result in 
Case #2 is the same as the result in Case #1. Subsection (b) applies because Treasurer did not intend Supplier Co. to 
have any interest in the check. It does not make any difference whether Supplier Co. was or was not a creditor of 
Corporation when the check was drawn. 
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instance,221 where a check is evidencing a loan was issued to both the husband and the wife, but 
only the husband had in fact applied for the loan, the wife’s unauthorized indorsement was held 
to be immaterial. The plaintiff (Issuing Bank) issued two cashier’s checks payable to husband 
and wife. These checks were for loans made by the plaintiff bank. After wife’s indorsement on 
the checks forged, the husband deposited them to the account of his company in First National 
Bank. After that, First National Bank indorsed the checks and processed them for payment. The 
plaintiff bank promptly paid on each check. After many renewals of the loans and after several 
payments against the principal, the loans were in default. The plaintiff bank sued the First 
National Bank on its statutory warranty under section 4-207 alleging that First National Bank 
cashed checks bearing the wife’s forged indorsement. The trial court gave issuing bank judgment 
against the husband; however, denied judgment against wife and cashing bank. The trial court 
found that the Issuing Bank drew the cashier’s checks with the intention that wife has no interest 
in them. Thus, by operation of § 3-405(1)(b), the forged indorsement of the wife was immaterial, 
and therefore the depositary bank is not liable for conversion. The Missouri appeals court 
affirmed.222 
b. Deception by Employee or Someone communicating with Drawer 
Under Article 3, an indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee on the face of 
the instrument is effective. Such when (1) An imposter induced a drawer to issue an instrument 
payable to him.223 (2) A representative signing on behalf of a drawer intending the named payee 
to have no interest in the instrument.224 (3) A representative of a drawer supplied the drawer with 
the name of the payee intending the named payee to have no interest.225 (4) An employee forges 
the indorsement of a check payable to his employer.226 However, the employer is not responsible 
if the employee has an authority that merely allows the latter to have access to instruments or 
blank or incomplete instrument forms which are being stored or transported or are part of 
incoming or outgoing mails, or similar access.227 
These provisions reflect the public policy that a drawer should bear the loss resulting 
from undiscovered impersonation and that an employer issuer or payee should bear the loss from 
a dishonest employee as a risk of the business. The rules govern employer’s responsibility 
located under the general rule of section 3-406 which tells that a person whose lack of ordinary 
care substantially contributes to a forgery precluded from asserting that forgery against an 
individual who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or collection. In leverage, 
the drawer or payee in these circumstances is typically in a better position to prevent the 
forgeries.228 Consequently, a forged indorsement is efficient, assuming that the employee dealing 
with the instrument has not acted according to the direction of the employer drawing the 
instrument. Thus, there is no cause of action in conversion against a person who in good faith 
                                                          
221 - Am. Nat ' l Bank v. Seidel, 622 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
222 - Am. Nat'l Bank, 622 S.W.2d. at 21. 
223 - Section 3-404.  
224 - § 3-405 (2). 
225 - § 3-405 (3). 
226 - § 3-405 (3). 
227 - Id.  
228 - Section 3-405 imposes liability on the employer for forged indorsements by an employee (subject to a 
contributory negligence defense), where the employee has “responsibility” for the instrument.  
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pays or takes it for value, and the drawer or payee must recover directly or indirectly from the 
forger or bear the loss.   
i. Imposter 
According to subsection 3-404(a), an imposter229 is a person by using the mails or 
otherwise, induced a drawer to issue a check to him or her, or his or her integrated into the name 
of the payee.230 The official comment to section 3-404231 indicates that under old Article 3, the 
former subsection 3-405(1)(a) governed the impostor cases while subsection 3-405(1)(b) 
governed the fictitious payee cases. However, current section 3-404 replaces former subsection 
3-405(1)(a) and (b) and modifies the previous law in some respects. Former section 3-405 was 
read by some courts to require that the indorsement is in the exact name of the named payee but, 
amended Article 3 rejects this outcome. Currently, in § 3-404(c), the only requirement is that the 
indorsement must be made in a name substantially identical to that of the named payee. Also, 
subsection (c) recognizes the fact that the deposit of checks may occur without indorsement.  
Moreover, subsection 3-404(a) changes former section 3-405 in a case where the 
impostor is impersonating an agent. Under former subsection 3-405(1)(a), if an impostor 
impersonated Sam and induced the drawer to draw a check to the order of Sam, the impostor 
could negotiate the check. However, if the impostor impersonated Sam, the president of Smith 
Co., and the check was payable to the order of Sam Co., the section is not applicable. In current 
Article 3, under subsection 3-404(a) the impostor’s negotiation of the check is legitimate in both 
cases.232 
The defense of imposter was rejected in the absence of false identity.233 The plaintiff, 
Advocate Health & Hospitals Co., issued a check to an attorney as a settlement in a malpractice 
action after the attorney falsely represented that he was authorized to settle the claim and 
tendered a notarized covenant not to sue bearing his client’s forged signature. The settlement 
subsequently vacated, and the medical malpractice claim against Advocate Health & Hospitals 
Co. went forward. Advocate Health & Hospitals Co. then sought recoupment of the check 
amount, alleging that due to the client’s forged indorsement the defendant bank’s payment of the 
check was not correct under section 4-401. The defendant bank asserted the imposter defense. 
The court rejected, holding that none of the evidence presented by the defendant bank, including 
the notarized covenant, established that the attorney had ever represented himself as the client 
and did not prove that the assumption of identity is what induced Advocate Health & Hospitals 
Co. to issue the settlement check.234 The statements indicate that the attorney indeed 
misrepresented his authority to settle, yet misrepresentation of authority is not an imposture and 
has never been enough to trigger the defense. Thus, no imposture had taken place; and material 
                                                          
229 - “Imposter” under old Article 3 referred to impersonation and did not extend to a false representation that the 
party was the authorized agent of the payee. Current § 3-404(a) eliminates this qualification. See § 3-404 Official 
Comment. 1. 
230 - Current § 3-404(a); old § 3-405(1)(a). See also, 2 Thomas D. Crandall et al., Uniform Commercial Code § 
17.12.2 (Aspen. eds., 1995). 
231 - Section 3-404. Official Comment. 1. 
232 - Id. 
233 - Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Bank One, N.A., 348 Ill. App. 3d 755, 284 Ill. Dec. 710, 810 N.E.2d 500 
(2004). 
234 - Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 765.  
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questions of fact remained as to what transpired before the issuance of the settlement check. 
Therefore, the defendant bank could not contend that there is no set of facts would entitle 
Advocate Health & Hospitals Co. to recover for conversion. 
However, the imposter defense is effective even when the communication with the 
imposter occurred through representations by a third party. For instance,235 where the imposter 
the wife came to the office of contractors accompanied by a guy whom she introduced to the 
contractors as her husband. She wanted a mortgage on a real estate owned by both the real 
husband and herself. The real husband does not know his ex-wife’s attempt. The drawer, 
Philadelphia Title Ins. Co. did not deal directly with the imposter. However, the drawer accepted 
the word of the contractors that the deed and mortgage signed by the real husband. The 
Pennsylvania supreme court stated that both § 3-405(1)(a) and its official comment leave no 
doubt that the impostor can induce the drawer to issue him or his confederate a check within the 
meaning of the section, even when the impostor did not carry out his impersonation before the 
very eyes of the drawer. Subsection 3-405(1) (a)236 says the inducement might occur by “the 
mails or otherwise,” which was broad enough to cover the case.237 
In different facts,238 American General Financial Services, Inc., was contacted on the 
telephone by a man, later revealed to be an imposter. The imposter sought a loan from American 
General Based on the information provided by him over the telephone, American General ran a 
credit check on the real name, finding his credit to be excellent. American General Officers 
informed the imposter that they would need personal tax returns for the prior two years and 
questioned him what he intended to do with the proceeds of the desired loan. The imposter sent 
by electronic facsimile to American General the requested tax returns of the real person and 
explained that he wanted the loan to renovate a property he owned. American General Officers 
approved the loan. The imposter appeared at American General’s office. He proffered an 
apparent Maryland driver’s license bearing the real individual’s personal information and the 
imposter’s photograph. After the imposter signed all the loan documents, American General 
issued to the imposter a loan check payable to the real person “Ronald E. Wilder.” Later that 
afternoon, the imposter presented the check to State Security Check Cashing, Inc., a check 
cashing business. At the time the imposter appeared in State Security’s office, only one employee 
was on duty, who considered the same driver’s license that the imposter presented to American 
General officers, then reviewed the American General loan documents regarding the check. The 
employee compared the check to other checks issued by American General which had been 
cashed previously by State Security. Considering the amount of the check relatively large, the 
employee called a higher officer, to confirm that the proper steps in verifying the check were 
correct. Upon the higher officer approval, the employee cashed the check, on behalf of State 
Security, for the imposter. Five days later, the real person “Ronald E. Wilder” appeared at the 
offices of American General indicating that the U.S. Secret Service notified him that a person 
applied for a loan in his name. 
Maryland appeals court stated that the trial court’s ruling in favor of American General is 
contrary to the position emphasized in official comment 3 of 3-404. If a depositary bank cashed 
                                                          
235 - Philadelphia Title Insurance Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.,419 Pa. 78, 212 A.2d 222 (Pa. 1965).  
236  - § 3-404(a). 
237 - Philadelphia Title Insurance Co., 419 Pa. 78, 225. 
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or deposited a check payable to an impostor, the effect of subsections 3-404(a) and (b) is to place 
the loss on the drawer of the check rather than on a depositary bank.239 Putting the loss on the 
drawer or the owner is due to the estimate that the drawer is in the best position to avoid the 
fraudulence. Maryland appeals court found no evidence to suggest the application of this default 
rule would be inappropriate. American General had the best means available by which to protect 
itself against the fraud, the least of which included contacting the personal references the 
imposter listed on the credit application, which may have helped protect American General 
against the fraud. Maryland appeals court rejected American General’s attempt to shift the 
burden of the loss to State Security on such a weak basis as State Security’s failure to ask the 
imposter for his thumbprint before cashing the check. While State Security did examine the same 
driver’s license and the loan documents American General created and found satisfactory in 
issuing the check.240 
ii. Faithless Employee  
In the case where a responsible employee forges the indorsement on an instrument 
payable to his employer, the latter will bear the loss.241 For instance,242 an employee of the 
charity opened a bank account in a name identical to that of the charity, then stole donation 
checks payable to the charity, indorsed them, and deposited them in the account. The charity 
sued the depositary bank for conversion under section 3-420. Also, the charity argued that the 
defendant bank was not acting in good faith when the defendant bank deposited the checks in the 
accounts having a name similar to the named payee. District Court of New Jersey concluded that 
the three-year statute of limitation at section 3-118 barred recovery as to checks stolen outside 
that limit-the “discovery rule” did not apply because there was no fraudulent concealment by the 
bank. The court rejected the conversion claim because under section 3-405 the indorsements 
were not forged. The court stated that a bank ordinarily would bear the loss when it makes or 
obtains payment on a fraudulently indorsed check. However, subsection 3-405(b) provides that 
the burden of loss shifts to the named payee when a bank acted in good faith and the person who 
indorsed the check is an employee of the payee entrusted with responsibility for the check. Also, 
District Court of New Jersey rejected the charity’s common law negligence claim that the 
depositary bank did not exercise ordinary care because banks do not owe a general duty of care 
to non-customers in the absence of a special relationship.  
In another example,243 District Court for the District of Nevada defined the meaning of 
the term “responsibility” in this context. A company’s employee opened a bank account in the 
company’s name, then deposited fraudulently indorsed checks stolen from the company. The 
company sued the bank for negligence and conversion under section 3-420, arguing the 
depositary bank was negligent in opening the account because the Articles of Incorporation 
submitted to the bank did not authorize the employee to open the account. The bank contended 
that the company entrusted the employee with “responsibility” for the checks under section 3-
405. The case required the court to examine what that term means. The court concluded that this 
                                                          
239 - Section 3-404. Official Comment. 3. 
240 - State Sec. Check Cashing, Inc., 409 Md. at 119,120. 
241 - § 3-405(b) comment. 3. 
242 - Armenian Missionary Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A., Civil Action No. 15-cv-03328-SDW-SCM (D.N.J. 
Sep. 11, 2015). 
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standard requires the bank to demonstrate that the company had authorized the employee to 
indorse, prepare or receive checks like those in question. The court rejected the bank’s 3-405 
defense because the employee was hired as an independent contractor to perform duties not 
related to processing the checks, and therefore was not entrusted with responsibility as to the 
subject checks. 
iii. Fictitious payee 
The employer will bear the loss when his employee signs on behalf of employer intended 
the payee to have no interest. For instance,244 a plaintiff drawer of the checks made them payable 
to dealers for bookkeeping purposes, intending the payees to have no interest in the checks. 
Instead of voiding the checks, his employee forged the payees’ indorsements and submitted the 
checks to the defendant in payment of her credit card debt. New York appeals court placed 
liability for the forged instruments with the drawer under the fictitious payee rule subsection 3-
405(1)(b) since nothing in the U.C.C. prevented the rule from extending to non-bank depositories 
where the drawer was in the best position to avoid the losses. Further, the bad faith exception to 
section 3-405 did not apply since there was no evidence showing that the defendant participated 
in the fraud.245 
Similarly, the employer will bear the loss, and the indorsement will be effective if an 
employee of a drawer has supplied him with the name of the payee intending the named payee to 
have no such interest.246 For instance,247 over a period of 10 years, ending in 1989, Jerome 
Rutberg, an insurance broker working for the Baer Insurance Agency, committed a fraudulent 
scheme by which he obtained checks from the plaintiff “Guardian Life Insurance Company of 
America.” Jerome Rutberg represented policy loans and dividends withdrawals made payable to 
Guardian Policyholders who had purchased life insurance through Baer Insurance and gained 
the proceeds by forging the payees’ indorsements. Guardian sued Chemical Bank on all the 
checks, for damages of over $253,000, the 131 checks obtained by Rutberg. 
A disputed question was whether Rutberg was an agent of Guardian Life Insurance. 
Judge Levine concluded that Rutberg was an agent. Also, according to the court, Guardian, was 
in the best position to prevent the loss. Judge Levine explained: “Guardian could have required 
authorization from the Policyholders before issuing the checks, could have sent the checks 
straight to the policyholders or could have given them contemporaneous notification that it had 
issued checks made payable to them.”  
Also, an employer will bear the loss if his agent or employee signing as or on behalf of 
him248 intended the payee to have on interest in the instrument. The result is the same whether 
                                                          
244 - Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 90 N.Y.2d 322, 660 N.Y.S.2d 689, 683 
N.E.2d 311 (1997). 
245 - Samuel J. M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 51 Syracuse L. Rev. 279 (2001) at 336. 
246 - Section 3-405(1)(c).  
247 - Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Chem. Bank, 94 N.Y.2d 418, 705 N.Y.S.2d 553, 727 N.E.2d 111 (2000). 
248 - “an unknown person forged checks payable to non-existent payees and indorsed them. The court held the 
indorsements were effective because whoever drew the checks intended the named payees to have no interest in 
them. The case involved an expansive reading of old § 3-405(1)(b), given the policy behind it discussed below. 
Nonetheless, it makes sense and current Article 3 carries it forward.” Perini Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 553 F.2d 398 
(5th Cir.1977). 
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agent employs a fictitious payee or a real payee. The agent’s intent to give nothing to the named 
payee is the determined point.249  
A significant issue concerning the unintended or fictitious payee provision seems to be 
whether the employee whose intent defines to whom the instrument is payable under 3-110, 
intended the named payee to have an interest.250 The result is same as an unauthorized signature 
was held to be irrelevant when a husband who applied for a loan and the wife also signed the 
application and the check for the loan proceeds paid out to both. However, the husband without 
authority of his wife, indorsed for both. The court concluded that the unauthorized signature does 
not shift the liability away from the drawer here, as the drawer never intended the other spouse to 
have an interest and required that person’s obligation on loan only to avoid any later collection 
issues.251  
Lastly, the padded payroll provision makes an employer responsible for his employee’s 
forgery of his indorsement on instruments.252 The official comment 3, case 7 illustrates the 
padded payroll provision by an example; Bursar signs checks on behalf of the corporation as a 
drawer. An Officer’s duties include the preparation of checks for payment to the cooperation’s 
creditors. The Officer prepares a check payable to the order of Supplier Co. for a Bursar’s 
signature. The Officer fraudulently informs Bursar that the check is needed to pay a due debt 
owed to Supplier Co, a company that does business with the corporation. In fact, Supplier Co. is 
not a creditor, and the Officer intends to steal the check. The Bursar signed it and sent it to the 
Officer for mailing. The Officer does not indorse the check but deposits it into an account in 
Depositary Bank that the Officer opened in the name “Supplier Co.” Eventually, the drawee bank 
honored the check. In this case, § 3-404(b)(i) does not apply because the Officer, under § 3-
110(a), is not the person whose intent locates to whom the check is payable. However, section 3-
405 does apply, and it deems the indorsement and deposit by the Officer an effective because the 
Officer is an authorized employee with responsibility concerning the check. Similarly, If 
Supplier Co. is a fictitious person, subsection 3-404(b)(ii) applies and the result is the same. The 
Officer’s deposit is deemed as a valid indorsement of the check regardless that Supplier Co. is a 
fictitious payee or a real person, or whether the debt was or was not owing to Supplier Co. The 
drawee bank may debit the account of the corporation and no breach of warranty by Depositary 
Bank under subsection 3-417(1)(a).253 
iv. The Need of Proper Indorsement, Reasonable Care, Good Faith to hold Employer 
Responsible  
A depositary bank will not be able to allege the defense against an employer on the last 
occasions unless the instrument presents a typical appearance. Also, the indorsement must be in a 
name substantially like the name of the person to whom the instrument is payable or deposited to 
an account in a name substantially like the name of the payee. However, the bank might bear the 
loss even with the defenses of sections 3-404, 3-405, and 3-406 if the bank did not exercise 
customary care or acted in bad faith.  
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Regarding the standard for evaluating whether the indorsement is correct under section 3-
404, section 3-204254 indicates a liberal standard recognized for a long time in the U.C.C. For 
instance, regarding an issue of misspelled indorsement,255 Tenth Circuit appeals court held that 
an indorsement that misspelled “Greater” as “Grater” in the name of the payee was not 
conclusive. The standard that the court used to scale the indorsement was whether the instrument 
presented a normal appearance. In contrary, when the payee’s name was as “Longview Fibre 
Co.” and the stamped indorsement read “Longview Fibre Products,” the court held that the 
argument of the bank using old section 3-405 as a defense against the plaintiff employer is not 
persuasive.256 
However, courts may reject the defense of negligent on the side of the employer, holding 
the depositary bank liable for the loss if the depositary bank failed to exercise ordinary care or 
acted in bad faith. Subsections 3-404(c) and 3-405(c) protect a depositary bank in case the 
indorsement is in a name substantially like the name of the person to whom the instrument is 
payable, or the instrument deposited to an account in a name substantially like the name of the 
payee. However, the depositary bank who is cashing or accepting an instrument for deposit is 
liable under § 3-405(d) and § 3-405(b) if the depositary bank failed to exercise ordinary care or 
acted in bad faith, and the depositary bank’s failure substantially contributed to the forfeiture 
resulting from the payment of the instrument.  
For instance,257 when a drawer purchased a vehicle from a seller who did not own it, but 
who represented that the car owned by him and his wife, who did not exist, the plaintiff wrote a 
check made payable to the two parties. The seller cashed the check at the defendant bank, 
signing both his name and that of his supposed wife. The drawer obtained a judgment against the 
defendant bank for negligently cashing the check over a forged indorsement. On appeal, the 
court affirmed, holding that the defendant bank was negligent in failing to require a proper 
indorsement under 3-405. The appeals court rejected the defendant bank’s argument that it was 
absolved from liability under 3-406 because the drawer’s negligence substantially contributed to 
the making of the unauthorized signature since he failed to investigate the ownership of the 
vehicle. The appeals court held that the bank had a duty to its depositor resting on an implied 
contract, and that appellee drawer did not induce the bank officer to cash a forged instrument. 
Furthermore, the bank might lose the defense against an employer if the bank failed to 
exercise ordinary care in taking the instrument for value. For instance,258 a Corporate executive 
embezzled $20 million in Corporate funds by sending wire transfers to herself and creating 
Corporate checks to pay off her credit card and other personal expenses. The Credit Card 
Company discovered the fraud but did not report this to the victimized Corporation for more than 
                                                          
254 - Section 3-204. Official Comment. 3. “Subsection (d) is a restatement of former Section 3-203. Subsection 3-
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a year. The Corporation then sued the Credit Card Company for negligence, conversion, breach 
of fiduciary duty, and aiding - abetting fraud. The trial court dismissed the claims; on appeal, 
South Dakota supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim reasoning that the 
defendant bank does not owe a duty to report suspicious activities to third parties. However, 
South Dakota supreme court reversed the dismissal of the conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and aiding - abetting claims. South Dakota supreme court held that the common law claims were 
not barred by Article 4A because they did not arise out of a wire transfer and thus the conversion 
claims based on negotiation and payment of the fraudulent checks were permitted by section 3-
420. Therefore, the case remanded for consideration of the conversion and common law claims. 
v. Standards of Reasonable Commercial Practices 
Banks must follow reasonable commercial practices to avoid the liability under an action 
for conversion or negligence for cashing or accepting an instrument for deposit over a forged or 
an unauthorized indorsement. Massachusetts appeals court of 259 defined the standards of 
“reasonable commercial practices” that a bank must follow to prevent the swap of liability for 
conversion. Govoni is an owner or small company. He is the treasurer as well. Govoni employed 
Maddalena as an accountant. Govoni placed their trust in Maddalena. Allowed him to keep the 
financial records, reconcile the checkbooks, and prepare the taxes. When Maddalena requested 
tax checks from the treasurer, Govoni simply signed checks in the requested amounts and gave 
them back to Maddalena. Govoni did not supervise, question or audit him, nor did he request 
receipts or review bank statements or tax returns. Govoni, guided by falsely inflated tax returns 
prepared by Maddalena, drew numerous checks for taxes. However, Maddalena deposited the 
checks into his account which was also at Mechanics Bank.260 
Maddalena at the defendant bank’s branch was known as a regular client. When the 
branch was busy, he buried the unindorsed checks in multiple item deposits of checks payable to 
Maddalena. Many deposits had at least eight items, and some had as many as sixty-one. The 
bank’s practice on multi-item deposits was for its tellers to quickly flip through the checks, 
scanning the back sides for missing indorsements and returning unindorsed checks to the 
presenter. However, the tellers were not required to inspect the face of a check to ensure the 
named payee indorsed it. Further, depending on the level of activity at the branch, the number of 
clients waiting in line, and familiarity with the depositor, a teller could entirely dispense with 
fanning. The trial court deduced that because Maddalena was a regular client presenting multi-
item deposits during busy times, the tellers did not flip through for indorsements and were thus 
unaware that Maddalena had inserted the Govoni’s unindorsed checks into the multi-item 
stacks.261 
 After Maddalena presented a stack of checks, the tellers then credited Maddalena’s 
account for the total amount which Maddalena wrote on the deposit slip. Then, the checks went 
to a central processing center for “proofing,” a process of checking the amount indicated on each 
deposit slip against a manual totaling of the individual checks accompanying each deposit slip. 
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Proofing did not include the verification of signatures or indorsements. After proofing, each 
check stamped with a Mechanics Bank processing stamp.262 
After that, the defendant bank sent the checks through an automated sorter. For checks 
such as these, drawn on one account at the bank and deposited to a different account at the bank, 
the sorting process resulted in debiting the drawer’s account and the depositor’s account 
receiving final credit.  
So, the defendant bank contended that the drawer’s negligence in failing to supervise the 
accountant preclude him from asserting the bank’s wrongdoing in the first instance. The court 
answered that even if the Govoni was negligent, the bank’s contention lacks merit under both the 
code’s provisions. The court stated that 3-406 is inapplicable to the bank.263  
The court concluded that the payment of the checks violated “reasonable commercial 
standards,” which deprives the defendant bank of the ability to invoke the provision 3-406 even 
if it was relevant. There is ample authority finding a failure to comply with “reasonable 
commercial standards” in these circumstances. There are certain conducts which considered so 
unjustified as to be commercially unreasonable as a matter of law. The bank involved with 
unreasonable payment of checks with missing indorse the defense of imposter ments, failure to 
respect restrictive indorsements, failure to discuss the authority to sign of one pretending to be an 
agent, and allowing deposit of a check indorsed by a corporate payee into a personal account.”264 
Also, the defendant bank apparently committed negligent conduct when it paid checks bearing 
incorrect indorsements and honored a check bearing an alteration of the name of the real 
payee.265 Likewise, the court stated that the payment of a check by a payee bank to an 
unauthorized third party without inquiry by the bank is commercially unreasonable as a matter of 
law.266 
 The defendant bank’s argument that other banks, following identical procedures, would 
also have allowed payment of these checks cannot alone make the bank’s procedures reasonable 
in the eye of law. An entire industry may behave unreasonably. Although the defendant bank has 
established that the procedures it has followed in paying the checks were common among banks, 
it has failed to show that such procedures were reasonable.267 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Section 23 of NIL afforded the real owner an absolute right to retrieve the proceeds of his 
instrument from any person received the instruments or its proceeds over a forged or an 
                                                          
262 - Id.  
263 - Govoni & Sons Constr. Co., 742 N.E.2d at 1102.   
264 - White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 15-5, at 761-762 (3d ed. 1988). 
265 -  The court cited Bullitt County Bank v. Publishers Printing Co., 684 S.W.2d 289, 291-293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); 
Olean Area Camp Fire Council, Inc. v. Olean Dresser Clark Fed. Credit Union, 142 Misc. 2d 1049, 1062, 538 
N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). 
266 - Govoni & Sons Constr. Co., 742 N.E.2d at 1102.   
267 - Govoni & Sons Constr. Co., 742 N.E.2d at 1103.   
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unauthorized indorsement. Jurisdictions allowed retrieval under two theories; Conversion or 
Money had and received.   
Both brokers and depositary banks were liable to the real owner. However, courts 
developed an exception for a broker who dealt with negotiable securities in a bearer form 
because the real owner of bearer bonds has no outstanding rights against the broker since the 
bearer bonds move between people such as cash and the title pass by delivery alone.  
However, a depositary bank is liable for conversion or money had and received 
regardless whether the bank has performed in good faith, according to reasonable commercial 
standards, and has parted with the proceeds. The real owner need only to show that s/he is the 
owner of the instrument at the time the depositary bank converted it. 
Also, a depositary bank is liable for money had and received. The money should not in 
justice be retained by the depositary bank and which in equity and good conscience the 
depositary bank should return it to the real owner. The right to recover does not rely upon privity 
of contract but on the obligation to restore which the law implies “should be returned” where a 
person is unjustly enriched at another’s expense.  
The Uniform Commercial Code (1952) under § 3-419(3) altered the preceding rules 
regarding depositary banks’ liability on cashing or accepting for deposit instruments over an 
unauthorized or a forged indorsement. Former § 3-419(3) provided complete protection to a 
depositary bank cashing, taking by transfer other than negotiation, obtaining payment, or 
receiving payment on forged instruments if the bank acted in good faith and according to 
reasonable commercial standards. However, courts had taken a creative approach to interpreting 
former § 3-419(3) in a way to find that the depositary bank liable. Courts focused on the terms 
“representative,” “proceeds remaining” and “adherence to reasonable commercials standards.” 
Courts criticized the defense of § 3-419(3) which was the reason that drove the 
Legislatures to the latter amendment of the subsection in 1990. Courts recognized that the 
subsection included depositary banks within its broader concept of “representative,” only when 
the banks are acting as a “representative.” The courts justified that a direct suit against the 
depositary bank avoids circuitous litigation. The direct action would reduce circuitous litigation 
to single suit and ensure judicial efficiency and will transfer the loss to the party on whom the 
loss will ultimately lie. Also, Courts stated, in relying on the pre-U.C.C. doctrine of ratification, 
that when the real payee brought an action against a depositary bank, the action is deemed to 
have ratified the collection of the proceeds from the payor bank. This ratification conveys the 
remittance of the funds by the payor bank into an authorized act for which the payor bank may 
debit the drawer’s account. However, ratifying the collection does not constitute ratification for 
the payment to the forger. The courts held that a depositary bank eventually would bear the loss 
under the breach of implied warranty because it is the person who communicates with the forger. 
The Legislature of § 3-420 drew from the courts’ reaction that there is no basis for 
requiring the owner of the check to bring multiple actions against the various payor banks and to 
require those banks to assert warranty rights against the depositary bank. In revised article 3, the 
defense provided by § 3-420(c) is limited to collecting banks other than the depositary bank. 
After the amendment of 3-419, the real owner’s right to sue a depositary bank for 
conversion incorporated in § 3-420(c). Also, Article 3 is the applicable law. Thus, once an 
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instrument is indorsed and delivered to a depositary bank, Article 3 is the applicable law. The 
owner could not sue the drawer or the payor bank if the location of the checks were known. 
However, when the check is payable to co-payees, the payee who is indorsement forged has the 
right to sue the drawer. The claim of the drawer discharged by payment of the draft to the all 
owners; since the co-owner did not indorse the draft, there was no discharge for the drawer under 
§ 3-602.  
 
Also, the real payee must receive the instrument from the drawer. It is only then s/he 
became the owner of the instrument. Also, if the drawer issued the instrument to the bearer, the 
holder deemed to be the owner. Moreover, if a co-owner of a company issued an instrument as 
the company’s representative and indorsed the instrument to himself, the other co-owners are not 
entitled to conversion action. Also, when an instrument in a bearer form, any person is an owner 
so long as that person possesses the instrument and thus under 3-301, the holder is entitled to 
enforce it.  
 
After the delivery of the check, the payee as an owner could sue only the depositary bank, 
not the drawer because the location of the checks was known. The payee could not recover from 
the drawer on the underlying obligation because the delivery of the check suspended that under 
3-310. Cases in which an instrument is payable to two persons and the two persons are not 
alternative payees, under § 3-110(d) the check can be negotiated or enforced only by both 
payees. Moreover, the owner has to notice that the three-year limitation period at § 3-118 begins 
at the time of the conversion when the cause of action accrues, not its later discovery unless the 
defendant engaged in fraudulent concealment. 
 
Furthermore, the depositary bank is liable only to the amount of an instrument under § 3-
420(b) unless proof introduced which would find otherwise. Subsection 3-420(b) allowed 
depositary banks to provide evidence that may minimize its obligation. 
 
The depositary bank may avoid the liability if the proceeds went to the intended party or 
if the forger’s indorsement is legally irrelevant such as instances involving an imposter, a 
fictitious payee, and a padded payroll, and the case where a responsible employee forges the 
employer’s indorsement. 
 
Subsection 3-404(b) covers cases in which an instrument is payable to a fictitious or non-
existing person and to cases in which a payee is a real person, but the drawer or the maker does 
not intend the payee to have any interest in the instrument. Also, subsection 3-404(b) applies to 
any instrument, but its essential value is concerning checks drawing by corporations, other 
organizations, and all other forged check cases. However, the defense 3-404(b) does not apply 
where a faithless employee stole check payable to his employer. 
 
Under Article 3, an indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective. 
Such when: an imposter induced a drawer to issue an instrument, a representative signing on 
behalf of a drawer intending the named payee to have no interest on the instrument, a 
representative of a drawer supplied the drawer with the name of the payee intending the named 
payee to have no interest, and an employee forges the indorsement of a check payable to his 
employer. These provisions reflect the public policy that a drawer should bear the loss resulting 
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from undiscovered impersonation and that an issuer or a payee should bear the loss from his 
faithless employee as a risk of the business.  
 
The official comment to section 3-404 indicates that under old Article 3, the former 
subsection 3-405(1)(a) governed the impostor cases while subsection 3-405(1)(b) governed the 
fictitious payee cases. However, current section 3-404 replaces former subsection 3-405(1)(a) 
and (b). Former section 3-405 was read by some courts to require that the indorsement is in the 
exact name of the named payee. Currently, in § 3-404(c), the only requirement is that the 
indorsement made in a name substantially identical to that of the named payee.  
 
Moreover, subsection 3-404(a) changes former section 3-405 in a case where the 
impostor is impersonating an agent. Under former subsection 3-405(1)(a), if an impostor 
impersonated Sam and induced the drawer to draw a check to the order of Sam, the impostor’s 
negotiation is effective. However, if the impostor impersonated Sam, the president of Smith Co., 
and the check was payable to the order of Sam Co., the section is not applicable. Under current § 
3-404(a) the impostor’s negotiation of the check is legitimate in both cases. Also, the imposter 
defense is effective even when the communication with the imposter occurred through 
representations by a third party. Subsection 3-405(1) (a) says the inducement might be by “the 
mails or otherwise.” However, the courts rejected the defense of imposter in the absence of false 
identity. The reason to place the loss on the owner is due to the estimate that the owner is in the 
best position to avoid the fraudulence. 
 
The employer will bear the loss when his responsible employee forges his indorsement 
on an instrument payable to him. Also, the employer will bear the loss under when his employee 
signs on behalf of him intended the payee to have no interest. Similarly, the indorsement will be 
effective if the employee has supplied his employer with the name of the payee intending the 
named payee to have no such interest or if the employer’s agent signing as or on behalf of him 
intended the payee to have on interest. The result is the same whether agent employs a fictitious 
payee or a real payee. The agent’s intent to give nothing to the named payee is the determined 
point. 
 
However, Courts may reject the defense of negligent on the side of the employer, holding 
the depositary bank liable if the depositary bank failed to exercise ordinary care or acted in bad 
faith. Subsections 3-404(c) and 3-405(c) protect a depositary bank in case the indorsement is in a 
name substantially like the name of the person to whom the instrument is payable, or the 
instrument deposited to an account in a name substantially like the name of the payee. However, 
the depositary bank who cashed or accepted for deposit a forged instrument is liable under § 3-
405(d) and § 3-405(b) if the depositary bank failed to exercise ordinary care or acted in bad faith, 
and the depositary bank’s failure substantially contributed to the forfeiture resulting from the 
payment of the instrument.  
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